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E.O. 12065 GDS 4/26/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINR, IR

SUBJECT: REPORTING SUBJECTS

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AS YOU REQUESTED AND AS OPPORTUNITIES DEVELOP IN THE WEEKS AHEAD, HERE ARE SOME OF THE TOPICS ON WHICH WE COULD USE ADDITIONAL OR CONTINUING INFORMATION:

1. POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP.

A) WHO ARE THE POTENT FIGURES WITH AND WITHOUT OFFICIAL POSITIONS? WHOM SHOULD WE WATCH AS COMERS? NEED BIOS.

B) WHAT ARE THE POLITICAL ALLIANCES AND STRENGTHS OF AMIR ENTEZAM AND SABAGHIAN? WE KNOW RELATIVELY LITTLE OF EITHER.

C) WHERE DOES YAZDI STAND IN THE HIERARCHY AFTER HIS SHIFT TO MFA? DID HE GAIN OR LOSE POWER? HOW HAVE MFA PERSONNEL REACTED TO HIM AND ARE THERE ANY PREDICTABLE EFFECTS ON POLICY?

2. WHAT IS THE POPULAR IMPRESSION OF BAZARGAN? HOW IS HE REGARDED BY VARIOUS KEY GROUPS? DOES HE HAVE ANY RIVALS?

3. WE DO NOT HAVE A VERY GOOD FIX ON TALEGHANI, HIS ENTOURAGE AND LINKS TO OTHERS IN THE RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR ESTABLISHMENTS.

4. WE NEED SOME FAIRLY SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO THE DEPICTION OF TRENDS, INCLUDING A DESIGNATION OF SPECIFIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AREAS TO WATCH AND PERIODIC REPORTING. SEVERAL CATEGORIES WERE MENTIONED IN OUR EARLIER CABLE.

5. HOW IS THE US PERCEIVED? WHAT ACTIONS OR INACTIONS SINCE MID-FEBRUARY HAVE HELPED OR HURT US? WHAT COULD WE DO BETTER?

6. REPORTS OF MILITARY CONVERSATIONS ARE MOST HELPFUL. FROM TIME TO TIME IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO SUMMARIZE, DEPICTING TRENDS, FOR EACH OF THE SERVICES. POLICE AND GENDARMERIE INFO ALSO VALUABLE.

7. WE APPRECIATE EXTREMELY VALUABLE ECON REPORTING. WE COULD USE (AS PART OF NO. 4 ABOVE) REGULAR COVERAGE OF MARKET BASKET PRICES AND SHORTAGES, EMPLOYMENT, GRIPEs. HOW ARE THE UNEMPLOYED MAKING ENDS MEET?

(ΔYA)

8. WHAT ARE THE ACTIVITIES, STRENGTHS, PLANS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRATS (NATIN-DAFIARY). NATIONAL FRONT (SANJABI), LEFT GUERRILLAS (FADEYEEN), VARIOUS MUJAHEDIN GROUPS, PRO-SHAM ELEMENTS

9. HOW FAIR THE PROVINCES, PARTICULARLY HARVESTS, FOOD AVAILABILITY

10. WHAT IS STATUS OF EFFORTS TO CLOSE DOWN, SELL OFF OR SHIP OUT MILITARY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT?

11. WHAT CAN YOU GATHER OF PERCEPTIONS OF KEY EMBASSIES? WHAT ARE THE SOVIETS UP TO?

12. WHAT IS THE SITUATION WITH THE UNIVERSITIES. MIRT. OTHER MEDIA?

13. STATUS OF PLANNING FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS:
14. WHAT HAVE PGDI/KHOMR NIDONE ON AMENSTY FOR MILITARY,

15. AND, IN BETWEEN, DON'T FORGET TO PLAN THE FOURTH OF JULY PARTY. VANCE

(ΔΥΥ)

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
CONFIDENTIAL

September 2, 1979

L. Paul Bremer III, Esquire
Deputy Executive Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Jerry:

I have been very busy lately and I'm a bit behind on my correspondence. You've been having your hands full moving into a new job, too, I suppose. I hope Francie and the kids are settling in all right. Sharon, I gather from her letters, is beginning to pace a bit in Michigan; if she can't come out here fairly soon, she will move to Washington when school is out next year. Don't say it: you told me so.

Things are quite exciting in Tehran. Not surprisingly, I am spending about 85% of my time helping American businessmen distinguish between revolutionary rhetorical form and back-to-business substance. The Khomeini crowd really seem to want to get people back to work and they are willing to take the necessary steps (and make the necessary compromises in revolutionary terms) to do it if Americans will modify contracts to reflect the changes wrought by the revolution. I've had some successes, and my problem most often is to convince some of the American players that if they come out here to talk, they won't go up against a wall.

This brings me to goings on in Iran politically. Frankly, I disagree with our position that there is dual government, i.e., Bazargan and Khomeini. I suspect the dual government analytical construct is popular because it implies we can influence at least part of the policy machinery; to contend that Khomeini is the only real source of power means we then have to explain how it is we can protect our interests here by only indirect communication through a third party obviously not in sympathy with us on many questions (and itself not all that well plugged in to the people that matter).

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It seems to me that if there ever was a dual government, it ended early on as Khomeini quickly because the source of power. I view Khomeini's recent crackdown on the Kurds, attacks on the left, public contempt for the critical intelligentsia, and apparently temporary restrictions on the press in recent weeks, rather than as a panic reaction to events beyond his control, as a systematic use of power by a man who has said publicly that he is not going to repeat Kerensky's mistake of not using the weapons of the revolution against sometime allies of convenience who would seize the movement for their own ends.

I think there is a question of timing here, too. Khomeini sees his Mullah-dominated constitutional assembly completing the constitution he wants for the Islamic Republic he wants. A few weeks from now the revolution will in effect be declared a success and the new permanent government will be launched. It seems to me Khomeini couldn't give it a better christening present than an opposition that has been disarmed and fragmented and a populace that has had the requirement for order and submission to the government made transparently clear. Besides, at this point, Khomeini can order half a million people into the streets on a few hours notice; his revolutionary guards will throw themselves joyously on any group, defenseless or not. In six months or a year, the inevitably disenchantments must set in, his ability to deal with critics will be less crisp, and I expect he would rather see his new government concede a measure of reform--and freedom--from strength and when it is ready to do so than to appease critics it can no longer so easily kick into line.

What of the implications for US interests? Well, if Khomeini is able to contain the disenchantments, you have improved prospects for internal stability fairly soon and for unimpaired territorial integrity. Also, it is clear to me that, in addition to order, Khomeini wants to get people back to work to ensure a decent--and even rising by local measures--standard of living. (A moral and even austere Islamic Republic should not be supposed to mean either an idle or backward one, I have been told.) Thus,

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our interest in continued access to Iran's oil should be safeguarded by the new government's ability to maintain order in the oil fields and need for earnings. Our interest in Iran's spending its oil earnings in the US should be advanced (if we don't blow it by not responding to expressions of interest) by their need--increasingly beginning to be realized--to translate oil dollars into jobs through either consumer imports or, much more likely, labor intensive projects that will lead to relatively labor intensive industries. (I think this bodes well for increasing oil production, too, eventually.) Finally, a confident Khomeini with a good grip on things at home and much skepticism of things Western is going to give us real problems on many multilateral issues. We need him at least as much as he needs us in the near term and so we don't have much to threaten him with. Particularly on Middle East policy, he is going to be a force we will have to reckon with.

Incidentally, Jerry, I wish I could say I have good contacts with the important Mullahs who confirm all this. Obviously, I don't. I do have contacts with some of Khomeini's emissaries to the business world, a half dozen, half shaved, but fairly sane, young "new men" and a couple of greasy old "new men" who make good sense. Still, it's mostly conjecture.

I've got one other officer besides myself in what is supposed to be a four-man section. I particularly need a good economic analyst. A guy on the Iranian desk, Mark Johnson, is "thinking" about volunteering; he has been for two months. Any chance of an appropriately senior officer calling him in and giving him a push?

Sorry about how long this has become. All the best.

Sincerely,

Andrew D. Sens

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EMBASSY OF THE
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September 4, 1979

NOTE FOR POL - Mr. Limbert

FROM: ECON - A. D. Sens

The implications as I read ~~them of~~ your recent cable on the political structure here correctly seem to be right on the mark. I think you should have gone further to say what the implications are of the demise of the "dual government" construct for US interests. Vic suggested that I give you my thoughts in case they might be useful for a follow-up cable at some point. Here goes:

It seems to me that if there ever was a dual government, it ended early on as Khomeini quickly became the source of power. I view Khomeini's recent crackdown on the Kurds, attacks on the left, public contempt for the critical intelligentsia, and apparently temporary restrictions on the press in recent weeks, rather than as a panicky reaction to events beyond his control, as a systematic use of power by a man who has said publicly that he is not going to repeat Kerensky's mistake of not using the weapons of the revolution against sometime allies of convenience who would seize the movement for their own ends.

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will be less crisp, and I expect he would rather see his new government concede a measure of reform--and freedom--from strength and when it is ready to do so than appease critics it can no longer so easily kick into line.

What of the implications for US interests? Well, if Khomeini is able to contain the disenchantments, you have improved prospects for internal stability and for unimpaired territorial integrity. Also, it is clear to me that, in addition to order, Khomeini wants to get people back to work to ensure a decent--and even rising by local measures--standard of living. (A moral and even austere Islamic Republic should not be supposed to mean either an idle or backward one, I have been told.) Thus, our interest in continued access to Iran's oil should be safeguarded by the new government's ability to maintain order in the oil fields and its need for earnings. Our interest in Iran's spending its oil earnings in the US should be advanced (if we don't blow it by not responding to expressions of interest) by their need--increasingly beginning to be realized--to translate oil dollars into jobs through either consumer imports or, much more likely, labor intensive projects that will lead to relatively labor intensive industries. (I think this bodes well for increasing oil production, too, eventually.) Finally, a confident Khomeini with a good grip on things at home and much skepticism of things Western is going to give us real problems on many multilateral issues. We need him at least as much as he needs us in the near term and so we don't have much to threaten him with. Particularly on Middle East policy, he is going to be a contrary force we will have to reckon with.

cc: CHG:VTomseth

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1082
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0119
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0126
RUHQAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0126
RUHQOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 0114
RUQMDR/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0123
RUQMOB/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0102
RUHQQT/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0140
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0143
RUSELY/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0159
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0123
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0127
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0097
RUHQMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0139
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0042
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0136
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CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: STATE 6/7/85
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DISTR: POL RF

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 5930

E.O. 12265: 3DS 6/7/85 (MCGAFFEY, DAVID C.) OR-P

TAGS: PINT, IR

SUBJ: KHOMEINI EXCLUDES SECULARS FROM HIS REVOLUTION

REF: TEHRAN 5785

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT: REPORTING CABLE)

2. SUMMARY: IN SPEECH ON JUNE 5, COMMEMORATING 16TH ANNIVERSARY OF ABORTIVE UPRISING WHICH, FOR KHOMEINI, WAS START OF REVOLUTION, KHOMEINI CONDEMNED AS "DEVIA-TIONISTS" ANYONE OUTSIDE HIS BRAND OF REACTIONARY ISLAM, GIVING "OUTSIDERS" CHOICE OF TOTAL CAPITULATION OR DESTRUCTION. END SUMMARY.

3. SINCE THE SUCCESS OF THE REVOLUTION IN FEB 1979, AUTHORITIES IN IRAN HAVE BEEN ANXIOUS TO DISCOUNT ITS LARGELY SPONTANEOUS NATURE. SEEKING ITS ORIGINS IN (AND CLAIMING ITS CONTINUITY FROM) HISTORICAL EVENTS. MOST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE PGOI, AND MOST SECULAR POLITICAL GROUPS, TRACE ITS BEGINNINGS TO 1953 AND THE MOSSADEGH PERIOD. THE EXTREME-LEFT FEAYEN-I-CHALQ TRACE IT BACK MERELY TO THEIR ORGANIZATION'S FOUNDING IN THE LATE '50S. IN PROCLAIMING THE FIFTEENTH OF KORDAD (JUNE 5) A DAY OF NATIONAL MOURNING, AND SPECIFICALLY IN HIS SPEECH ON THAT DAY, AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI NOT ONLY CLAIMS JUNE 5, 1963, AS THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOLUTION, BUT EXPLICITLY EXCLUDES THESE OTHER GROUPS FROM PARTICIPATION IN "HIS" REVOLUTION.

4. JUNE 5, 1963 MARKED AN ABORTIVE UPRISING OF A COALI-TION OF BAZAARIS, ELEMENTS BACKED BY LAND HOLDING IN-TERESTS, AND PIOUS MUSLIMS, LED BY THE CLERGY INCLUDING KHOMEINI, PROTESTING THE SHAH'S "WHITE REVOLUTION" WHICH HAD BEEN PROCLAIMED THE PREVIOUS JANUARY AND INCLUDED LAND REFORM AND RATIFICATION OF A LAW WHICH PROVIDED FOR

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INADEQUATE---THESE PEOPLE SHOULD SEPARATE THEIR RANKS FROM THAT OF THE NATION. MY PROTESTS WHAT YOU ARE SEEING LIES IN ISLAM. I ADVISE YOU NOT TO SEPARATE YOUR PATH FROM THE CLERGY. IF THIS POWER IS LOST YOU WILL TURN INTO NOTHING. OR GOD BEAR WITNESS THAT I AM NOT SUPPORTING THE CLERGY JUST BECAUSE I AM A MAN OF THE CLOTH... IT IS THIS ...THAT THE PEOPLE WANT. END EXERPTS.

7. SOME OBSERVERS POINT OUT THAT HIS EXPLICIT THREAT OF DESTRUCTION AGAINST HIS OPPONENTS IS NOTHING MORE THAN A RESPONSE TO THE IMPLICIT THREAT OF CIVIL WAR RAISED BY THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT IN THEIR LETTER TO KHOMEINI, AND THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. OTHERS, HOWEVER, ARE FEARFUL. THEY STATE THAT KHOMEINI HAS DEFINED THE "ELECT" IN SUCH SPECIFICS THAT THE SECULAR PARTIES NOW HAVE NO CHOICE OTHER THAN EITHER TOTAL SUBMISSION (AND ABANDONMENT OF THEIR PRINCIPLES) OR OPEN OPPOSITION. THERE ARE STILL MANY WHO TREAT KHOMEINI'S STATEMENTS AS THE WORD OF GOD, AND THOSE MAY TAKE THE SPEECH AS PERMISSION FOR VIOLENCE AGAINST ANY WHO OPPOSE KHOMEINI.

8. COMMENT: WHETHER OR NOT KHOMEINI WAS SERIOUS IN CALLING FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF "DEVIATIONISTS," THIS SPEECH IS CLEARLY AN ESCALATION IN THE SPLIT BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND HIS CRITICS. THE ONE GROUP KHOMEINI DID NOT ATTACK, WAS THE OTHER AYATOLLAHS WHO HAVE CRITICIZED HIM. THEIR COMBINATION OR COOPERATION WITH THE SECULARISTS COULD BLUNT THIS ATTACK, BUT HE MAY BE HOPING TO ISOLATE THE SECULAR GROUPS BEFORE THERE CAN BE ANY JOINING OF FORCES. THE POSSIBILITY OF A VIOLENT CONFRONTATION HAS BEEN INCREASED BY THIS SPEECH, BUT KHOMEINI CLEARLY HAS THE POWER TO WIN AGAINST ANY SINGLE SECULAR OPPOSITION GROUP. THIS MAY THEN ACT AS AN IMPETUS FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE VARIOUS POLITICAL GROUPS, AND BETWEEN THEM AND KHOMEINI'S RELIGIOUS CRITICS. MAAS

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FEMALE SUFFRAGE. A RIOT WHICH FOLLOWED KHOMEINI'S SPEECH WAS PUT DOWN BRUTALLY AND KHOMEINI WAS ARRESTED. SUBSEQUENT ACTION BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS PREVENTED HIS TRIAL AND (PROBABLE) EXECUTION. THE "MARTYRS" OF THAT RIOT WERE PRIMARILY LOWER-CLASS CONSERVATIVE BAZAARIS AND RELIGIOUS STUDENTS.

5. KHOMEINI HAS RECENTLY BEEN RECEIVING INCREASING CRITICISM AND OPPOSITION. HIS DENIGRATION OF EX-PREMIER MOSSADEGH HAS BEEN CRITICIZED BY MOST SECULAR PARTIES AND POLITICIANS, INCLUDING PREMIER BAZARGAN. THE FORGHAN GROUP OF TERRORISTS HAVE PUBLICIZED THE IDEA OF "ISLAM WITHOUT CLERGY." THE BAR ASSOCIATION HEAD HAD DECLARED THAT ISLAMIC LAWS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT FOR THE 20TH CENTURY. THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT HAS DENOUNCED KHOMEINI AS A DICTATOR. AYATOLLAHS TALEGHANI AND SHARIATMADARI HAVE SPOKEN OUT AGAINST KHOMEINI'S CANDIDACY FOR THE PRESIDENCY, AND AGAINST HIS PLAN FOR A CONSTITUTION WITHOUT AN ELECTED CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. HE RESPONDED TO ALL THESE CRITICS IN A SPEECH TO FARMERS AND THEOLOGICAL STUDENTS IN QOM ON JUNE 5.

6. BEGIN EXERPTS. WHO CREATED THE JUNE 5 INCIDENT, WHO FOLLOWED IT UP...AND WHO IS TO BE RELIED ON FROM NOW ON? ...IT WAS THE LOWER CLASSES...THE FARMERS...THE WORKERS... THE MUSLIM BUSINESSMEN OF THE BAZAARS. IT IS THIS CLASS OF PEOPLE THAT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE A SAY IN RUNNING THE COUNTRY. OTHER HAVE NO RIGHT....THOSE WHO IMAGINE ANYTHING OTHER THAN ISLAM BROUGHT DOWN THE PREVIOUS REGIME, THOSE WHO CLAIM NON-MUSLIMS CONTRIBUTED TO THE OVERTHROW OF THE SHAH'S REGIME...YOU WILL NOT FIND ANY. THOSE WHO OPPOSE US...SHOULD BE PUT STRAIGHT BY GUIDANCE IF POSSIBLE...OTHERWISE THE SAME PEOPLE WHO DESTROYED THE REGIME WILL DESTROY THOSE ASSOCIATED, NOT-EXCLUSIVELY-ISLAMIC ELEMENTS. O YE WHO SUFFER FROM WESTERNIZATION...YOU, OUR JURISTS, OUR HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION, DO NOT FOLLOW THESE OTHER (WESTERN) JURISTS ...THESE CLASSES WHO BROUGHT ABOUT THE REVOLUTION ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS....THOSE WHO HAVE DEVIA-TIONIST VIEWS, THOSE WHO REGARD 1400-YR OLD ISLAM AS

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 74225

I.O. NAME: HIC-4 4/17/89 (STUMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
 TAGS: MINT, PROV, PINS, SCUL, IR
 SUBJ: ATMOSPHERICS: THE REVOLUTION AFTER TWO MONTHS

TEL: TEHRAN 3971

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
GRADE: STATE
APPRV: CH3: CWNAAS
TRFTD: POL: JDSTEMPEL
CLEAR: ECON: TAYLOR
ICA: ROSEN
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2. SUMMARY: ISLAMIC REVOLUTION'S POLITICO-ADMINISTRATIVE PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN MIXED TO DATE. PARALLEL GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURES CONTINUE TO CAUSE PROBLEMS AND GENERATE CONFLICTS. PALESTINIAN ROLE IN REVOLUTION MAY GROW. PUBLIC REACTION TO REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IS MIXED AND NO UNIFYING GROUNDSWELL HAS YET EMERGED. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE WILL EXACERBATE BOTH EXISTING AND FUTURE POLITICAL PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY.

3. DRAWING ON SERIES OF CONVERSATIONS AND SEVERAL VISITS TO FRIENDS IN SOUTH AND EASTERN TEHRAN, ACTING POL CHIEF OFFERS FOLLOWING ATMOSPHERICS ON UNFOLDING OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OVER PAST TWO MONTHS.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENT HAS CONTINUED TO DETRIORATE, EVEN WITH A GENEROUS ALLOWANCE FOR REVOLUTIONARY DIFFICULTIES. MANY ARE SURPRISED THAT ANYTHING IS GETTING DONE, GIVEN PROBLEMS OF KHOMEINI COMMITTEE INTERVENTIONS IN DAY-TO-DAY ACTIVITY OF GOVERNMENT. THOUGH MOST EVIDENT IN SECURITY AFFAIRS, WHERE COMMITTEE FORCES OFTEN ARREST, TRY AND SHOOT PEOPLE WITHOUT POOL'S KNOWLEDGE, DUAL STRUCTURE IS ALSO BOTHERSOME IN OTHER AREAS AS WELL. OFFICIALS IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS ARE UNWILLING TO MAKE DECISIONS OR TO PREPARE DOCUMENTS UNLESS SUPPLICANT HAS SOME KINDS OF COMMITTEE CLEARANCE. SITUATIONS, WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED TO IMPROVE SOMEWHAT HAVE NOT YET DONE SO. DIRECT REQUESTS FOR BRIBES HAVE TAPERED OFF SIGNIFICANTLY, BUT THOSE WHO HAVE HAD OCCASION TO SEEK GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTATION FOR SALE OF LANDS, BUILDING APPROVAL, ETC. FEEL IRANIAN INGENUITY IS SWIFTLY FINDING NEW WAYS AROUND ISLAMIC MORALITY. "DONATIONS" TO ONE'S FAVORITE MOSQUE SEEM TO BE THE MOST FAVORED CURRENT PLOY. IN ECONOMIC SECTOR, DECISION-MAKING IS STILL CONFUSED (SEE REYTEL) BUT HAS PROGRESSED FROM DEADLOCK POSED BY IMMEDIATE POST-REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD WHERE BANKING HAD COME TO A STANDSTILL. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IS SPOTTY--SHIRAZ REPORTS NEARLY ALL PLANTS OPERATING; TABRIZ REPORTS NONE. ECONOMIC CONFIDENCE IS DOWN, AND UNEMPLOYMENT IS THE SPECTER THAT STALKS ISLAMIC POLITICS.

5. IN PURELY POLITICAL SPHERE, REFERENDUM WAS TRIUMPH OF FORM OVER SUBSTANCE AND WIDELY RECOGNIZED AS SUCH, EVEN BY RELATIVELY UNSOPHISTICATED. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.

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WHICH NORMALLY ADMINISTERS ELECTIONS, WAS ALMOST WHOLLY ON SIDELINES. MINISTRY OFFICIALS INDICATE THE KHOMEINI COMMITTEE AT INTERIOR HAS ENTIRE ELECTORAL PROCESS VIRTUALLY ALONE. ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS IN COUNTRY WERE HAZARARD, SECRECY OF BALLOT WAS ABSENT, AND VOTE COUNT WAS WIDELY REGARDED AS A JOKE AT ALL LEVELS OF SOCIETY. IN ONE WAY, ALL THIS HAS BEEN BENEFICIAL--IT HAS DISCOURAGED OR REALIGNED SOME EXCESSIVE EXPECTATIONS LATELY HEARD REGARDING GOVERNMENT. IT HAS NOT, HOWEVER, CONTRIBUTED TO THE RESTORATION OF AUTHORITY. PGOI WANTS TO ASSESS ITSELF MORE FIRMLY, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM, VISIBLE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS SUCH AS POLICE CONTROL AND PROVISION OF SERVICES.

2. MAJOR SYSTEMIC CAUSE OF CONTINUED ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY FEATURES IS INTENSIFICATION OF PARALLEL STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT--THE BAZARGAN ADMINISTRATION ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE KHOMEINI COMMITTEES ON THE OTHER. INSTEAD OF DISAPPEARING, THE COMMITTEES HAVE CONTINUED TO PLAY MAJOR ROLE IN GOVERNMENTAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LIFE. THIS HAS HAD NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE PGOI'S ABILITY TO REFORM GOVERNMENT. FOREIGN MINISTER SANJABI'S RESIGNATION, AND THE HINTED RESIGNATIONS OF JUSTICE MINISTER AND EVEN OF BAZARGAN HIMSELF ARE MANTAINED IN THE AIR. AND UNEVEN PERFORMANCES BY VARIOUS MINISTERS AND AGENCIES UNDER PUBLIC CRITICISM. MEMBERS OF INTERIOR CENTRAL COMMITTEE LAST WEEK GOT INTO CONFLICT WITH MINISTER FAR JAVADI SADR WHEN HE ANNOUNCED SEVERAL SENIOR LEVEL APPOINTMENTS WITH GROUP. THE COMMITTEE ORDERED MINISTRY STAFF TO GO ON STRIKE AND REFUSE TO WORK, ACCORDING TO SANJABI, BUT SITUATION IS BRAGHT WITH IN. WHILE CONDITIONS HAVE NOT GOTTEN THAT BAD IN THE PAST, WE UNDERSTAND THERE HAVE BEEN SITUATIONS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN COMMITTEES AND GOVERNMENT. AT LEAST THREE OTHER MINISTRIES--MINISTRY OF JUSTICE--AND FEW OTHERS AS WELL.

ON THIS INTERNAL SPLIT BETWEEN ELEMENTS

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MONTHS, BROKE SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT FROM THE YOUTHS AS CRACKS APPEAR IN THE ISLAMIC PICTURE OF PARADISE SOUGHT.

10. MIXED REACTION TO REVOLUTION BECOMES POSITIVELY SCHIZOPHRENIC WHEN QUESTION OF REVOLUTIONARY EXECUTIONS COMES UP. THOSE BELOW 30 ARE CONVINCED OF JUSTICE OF KILLING SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF SHAH'S SUPPORTERS. THEIR PARENTS AND ELDERS ARE HORRIFIED, EVEN MANY OF THOSE WHO HAVE NOT AND WOULD NOT SUPPORT ANY FORM OF MONARCHICAL RESTORATION. AT LEAST TWO EMPHOSES HAVE BEEN PRESENT AT "GENERATION GAP" DISCUSSIONS WHEN COMMITTEE YOUTH GOT INTO VIRTUAL SHOUTING MATCHES WITH PARENTS OVER QUESTION OF JUSTICE OF REVOLUTIONARY EXECUTIONS. TEHRAN OVER PAST SEVEN DAYS HAS SEEN ADDITIONAL PHENOMENA--GANGS OF YOUTHS WHOSE PARENTS HAVE BEEN EXECUTED BANDING TOGETHER TO EXACT REVENGE ON REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS. NUMBERS OF EYEWITNESSES HAVE SEEN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS KILLED. PERSIAN WHO RUNS SMALL SHOPS AT SEVERAL SOUTH TEHRAN LOCATIONS SAYS UNPUBLICIZED NIGHT KILLINGS DID IN AN AVERAGE OF 30 REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS A NIGHT IN PERIOD APRIL 10-14 IN AREAS NEAR HIS STORES. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS ARE NOT GOOD, BUT POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS ARE WORSE--BLOOM IS OFF REVOLUTION FOR MANY IN SOUTH TEHRAN, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO ARE BEING "VOLUNTEERED" FOR GUARD DUTY BY LOCAL COMMITTEES WHO ARE CONDUCTING HOUSE-TO-HOUSE SEARCHES. THOUGH THIS SITUATION IS MANAGEABLE IN THE SHORT-RUN, IF IT BECOMES WORSE, REVOLUTIONARY ZEAL COULD DEGENERATE EVEN FURTHER INTO INTRA-MOVEMENT DOGFIGHTING.

11. NUMBER OF PERSIAN OBSERVERS BELIEVE REACTION TO KILLINGS AS FORMER ELITE COMES OUT OF ITS SHOCK AND STARTS TO FIGHT BACK, HOWEVER FEEBLY, WILL EVENTUALLY COUPLE WITH DISILLUSION OVER ECONOMIC PROSPECTS TO PROMOTE REAL TROUBLE FOR PCOI AND ISLAMIC MOVEMENT ITSELF. THERE IS ALSO A FAINTLY DISCERNABLE ANTI-PALESTINIAN BACKLASH, STEMMING FROM FAIRLY WILD PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT THEY MAY BE COMING TO FILL VOIDS LEFT BY DEPARTING WESTERNS. REVOLUTION PROMISED A LOT AND BOOSTED EXPECTATIONS. PERSIANS ARE MASTERS OF THE WHAT-HAVE-YOU-DONE-FOR-ME LATELY SCHOOL OF POLITICS, AND THERE PRESENTLY EXIST ELEMENTS IN THE HURLY-BURLY OF CONTEMPORARY IRANIAN POLITICS WHO WILL ACTIVELY EXPLOIT DIVISIONS WITHIN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT AND BETWEEN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT AND PCOI. THERE HAS AS YET BEEN NO REAL UNIFICATION OF EITHER IDEOLOGICAL THEME OR ADMINISTRATION, AND MANY ARE POSITIONING THEMSELVES TO EXPLOIT THE BREACH. ONLY THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL WEAKNESS HAS PREVENTED A SUBSTANTIAL CHALLENGE TO DATE. IN THIS CONNECTION, "DEFECTION" OF TALEGHANI FROM KHOMEINI CAMP, AND QUICKNESS OF FEDAYEEN TO RALLY TO HIS SUPPORT ARE TROUBLING. DEMONSTRATIONS BEGINNING APRIL 15 AND MARCH OF CHANTING STUDENTS AROUND TEHRAN OVER PAST THREE DAYS ARE VERY REMINISCENT OF THE NOVEMBER-JANUARY PERIOD JUST PAST.

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OSTENSIBLY OF THE SAME ISLAMIC MOVEMENT HAS BEEN TO AWAKEN HOPE IN THOSE OF ALL CLASSES WHO ARE GRADUALLY BEGINNING TO REJECT MUCH OF WHAT ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IS STANDING FOR. INSTEAD OF MOVING TOWARD MIDDLE AND COMPROMISE, KHOMEINI AND HIS COMMITTEES HAVE REMAINED REVOLUTIONARY PURISTS, ESPECIALLY ON DEALING WITH ELEMENTS OF OLD REGIME AND ON IMPOSITION OF ISLAMIC LAWS ON SOCIETY. FEDAYEEN AND MARXIST PARTIES HAVE HAD A RECRUITING FIELD DAY. WHILE THEY REMAIN WEAK RELATIVE TO MOSQUE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMICS, THEY ARE MAKING STRONG ORGANIZATIONAL EFFORT IN BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL FIELDS. THEIR LITERATURE IS WIDELY AVAILABLE THROUGHOUT CITY, AND NOTABLE NEW POSTER PAGE ONE DAILY. REPORTING OFFICER SPOKE WITH TWO IRANIANS, ONE AN OLD FRIEND, WHO HAVE BEEN ATTENDING FEDAYEEN-RUN POLITICAL CLASSES FOR PAST TWO WEEKS. AT RATHER LARGE DINNER OF 15 "BOSS PROFESSIONALS" PRESENT, ONLY TWO MAINTAINED THEY WOULD SIDE WITH ISLAMIC MOVEMENT AGAINST MARXISTS IN SHOWDOWN. THIS IS INDICATIVE, NOT DEFINITIVE; WHAT IS TROUBLE-SOME IS THAT MODERNISTS IN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT ARE ON DEFENSIVE, AND FEDAYEEN AND OTHER MARXISTS HAVE A GOOD HEADSTART ON BUILDING UP A VERY CREDIBLE BASE AMONG IRAN'S FUTURE MOVERS AND SHAKERS WHICH THEY DID NOT HAVE A MONTH AGO. SEVERAL PERSIAN ACADEMICS ARE CONVINCED FEDAYEEN HAVE ALSO MOVED DISCREETLY TO FORM USEFUL ALLIANCES WITH IMPORTANT TRIBAL GROUPS (A VIEW DEPUTY PM YAZDI SHARES).

B. UNEXPECTED WINDFALL FOR REPORTING OFFICER PRODUCED CHANCE TO HEAR JALEH SQUARE MUJAHIDDIN CENTRAL COMMITTEEMAN EXPOUND ON MUJAHIDDIN PLANS FOR NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS. REPORTING OFFICER WAS VISITING HOME OF OLD FRIEND NEAR JALEH SQUARE EVENING APRIL 13 WHEN FOUR GUESTS ARRIVED. EMBOFF WAS INTRODUCED AS SOMEONE WHO TAUGHT WITH HOST, AND GROUP REMAINED UNAWARE OF EMBOFF CONNECTION. ASSEMBLY IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO TALK POLITICS, AS MOST GROUPS DO IN IRAN THESE DAYS--VITALITY OF PERSIAN DISCOURSIVE LIFE IS SHOWN BY POPULAR APHORISM WHICH SAYS ANY FIVE IRANIANS WHO MEET WILL IMMEDIATELY PRODUCE SEVEN POLITICAL POSITIONS. MUJAHIDDIN COMMITTEEMAN DESCRIBED EXTENSIVE PALESTINIAN ROLE IN PREPARATION FOR REVOLUTION AND WHEN QUESTIONED BY OTHERS, INDICATED PLO WAS STILL PROVIDING EXTENSIVE SUPPORT IN MILITARY AREA FOR BOTH MUJAHIDDIN AND FEDAYEEN, PLUS SOME ADMINISTRATIVE HELP FOR KHOMEINI MOVEMENT. COMMITTEEMAN LAUGHED WHEN IRANIAN PROFESSOR ASKED HIM WHAT HE THOUGHT OF PLOI SPOKESMAN ENTZAR'S STATEMENT THAT THE PLOI WOULD GIVE NO MILITARY HELP TO PLO, AND SAID THIS WAS "NONSENSE FOR WESTERN CONSUMPTION; IRAN WILL HELP THE PLO WHEN IT IS TIME TO HELP." COMMITTEEMAN DREW PICTURE OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENT BUILDING ITS ORGANIZATION WITH PLO HELP, AND PAINTED ROSY PICTURE OF IRAN AS COMMITTEEMAN BEGAN TO COOPERATE BETTER WITH PLO. EMBOFF WAS COMMITTEEMAN'S OLD FRIEND.

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BY POOI LEARNING TO FOLLOW COMMITTEE INSTRUCTIONS BETTER. ONE INTERLOCUTOR ASKED WHAT MADE MUJAHIDDIN SO SURE PLO GROUP WOULD NOT SECRETLY STRENGTHEN THEIR FEDAYSEN FRIENDS AT EXPENSE OF MUJAHIDDIN. COMMITTEEMAN EXHIBITED CONFIDENCE ON THIS POINT, BUT WAS TEIN ON SPECIFICS. TWO OTHERS PRESENT THOUGHT PLO AND FEDAYSEN HAD MORE IN COMMON THAN PLO AND MUJAHIDDIN, BUT GROUP AGREED TO DISAGREE. (COMMENT: ACCORDING TO SOURCES WHO HAVE BEEN ATTENDING FEDAYSEN TRAINING SESSIONS, PLO BANNERS AND SLOGANS ARE PRESENT IN FORCE AT FEDAYSEN HEAD-QUARTERS, AND FEDAYSEN MILITARY TRAINING IS GIVEN EVERY WEEK DAY BY INSTRUCTORS WHO WERE TRAINED IN LEBANON. TRAINING IS PROVIDED ON ALL AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, MACHINE GUNS AND MORTARS.

9. GENERAL PUBLIC REACTION TO REVOLUTION IS MIXED BUT GENERALLY ACCEPTING. MANY OUTSIDE CITIES ARE NOT AFFECTED AT ALL. LOWER AND LOWER MIDDLE CLASSES IN EAST TEHRAN SHOUT SLOGANS OF REVOLUTION, BUT SEE LITTLE CHANGES IN LIFE. MIDDLE CLASSES FEAR ISLAMIC JUSTICE, BUT IT DOES NOT AFFECT MANY ON THE LOW END OF THE SCALE. SHORTAGES HAVE PREVAILED FOR SO LONG THAT THEY ARE REGARDED AS MINOR INCONVENIENCES. LIFE IS MARGINALLY BETTER THAN IT WAS LAST WINTER, AND WHILE REVOLUTION GETS CREDIT FOR SOME IMPROVEMENT IN ECONOMIC SITUATION FOR LOWER CLASS GROUPS, COMING OF SPRING GETS MORE. POLITICALLY, ORDINARY PEOPLE HAVE HAD THEIR FOM AND ARE READY TO GO ABOUT BUSINESS OF LIVING. REVOLVED POOL NOT YET COME HAVE BEEN ABLE TO RETAIN SOME OF THE BENEFITS OF UNIFYING THEM. EVEN A FEW LEFT-SOFT ISLAMIC REVOLUTION THE BACKBONE OF ROMANIAN PEOPLE, APPEALING PRIVATE SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT A FIRM ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. IMPROVING OF POLITICAL CLIMATE COME WITH POOL'S ABILITY TO RESTORE FULL AUTHORITY TO ITSELF AND SET FORTH IN COPING WHICH NO ONE MAY FULLY BE ABLE TO CONTROL. THE SHORT AND MEDIUM TERM. THERE IS A LOT OF MAY, BUT THE SHORT TERM.

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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

SECSTATE WASHDC, PRIORITY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS FROM CHARGE

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/2/85 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M

TAGS: PFOR, IR

SUBJ: VOA INTERVIEW

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING MESSAGE)

2. IN ALL MY RECENT CALLS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE HIT ME HARD WITH COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE CRITICAL MANNER IN WHICH THE WESTERN MEDIA, PARTICULARLY THE U.S., IS TREATING THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. THE FOLKS CURRENTLY IN THE SADDLE, NO LESS THAN THEIR PREDECESSOR, ARE PRETTY THIN SKINNED AND PRONE TO SEE A CONSPIRACY --USG, ZIONIST, OR OTHERWISE. ALSO, I HAVE BEEN REMINDED OF OUR DAILY STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR BAKHTIAR IN JANUARY AND OUR OFFICIAL SILENCE (WHICH I HAVE STRONGLY SUPPORTED) ON THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT IN THE LAST MANY WEEKS. THERE IS NO CURE, OF COURSE, FOR PERSIAN PARANOIA, BUT I BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONSIDER SOME EFFORT TO PRESENT A MORE POSITIVE U.S. VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT.

3. OUR PAO TOLD ME THAT, WHEN HE WAS IN WASHINGTON IN LATE MARCH, VOA WAS TO APPROACH YOU RE AN INTERVIEW ON IRAN. THIS SEEMS TO ME TO BE AN EXCELLENT FORUM AND I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE ON THE TASK SOON. YOU ARE AN OLD HAND AT THIS AND CAN PLAY THE THEMES OF NORMALIZATION, HISTORICAL TIES, PARALLEL INTERESTS, THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE, ETC. WITHOUT TOO CLOSE AN EMBRACE OF THE GOVERNMENT, EITHER TO ITS DISADVANTAGE OR OUR OWN. NAAS##

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**International
Communication
Agency**

United States of America
Washington, D.C. 20547

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September 26, 1979

*file Reel
from
Presch
10/16/79*

MEMORANDUM FOR:

State/NEA - Mr. Harold H. Saunders

FROM:

ICA/NEA - R. T. Curran *R.C.*

SUBJECT:

Public Diplomacy Communication
Between United States and Iran
October 1979 - February 1980

Based on discussions in your office on September 7, ICA agrees that some cautious exploration of additional opportunities for communication between the United States and Iran in the public diplomacy area is in order in the next four or five months.

As a guiding practice, we will try to encourage institutional linkages, a concept of communication endorsed on September 7. These linkages will stress the two-way flow of relations. At this time it must be recognized that their development depends on creating an atmosphere of trust and respect. In initial stages, friendly and understanding one-on-one personally developed ties are essential. Through such personal rapport can be built carefully determined institutional linkages which, in turn, can nurture further mutual relationships. Likely fields for initiating or reestablishing contact include Iranology, the humanities, physical sciences, English teaching, and physical education.

Still continuing, albeit in a low-key, modest fashion with currently limited, one-way — Iranians to the United States — programs, is the work of the Fulbright Commission. The United States should maintain its financial support of these operations as a well-established and core institutional link between private and public

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educators and institutions in both countries. Similarly, judiciously planned activities of the American Institute for Iranian Studies should be fostered.

Within this general approach and responding to the recommendations of the Charge' and our Public Affairs Officer, we will examine the following venues for some restrained initiatives which may be considered if Iranian authorities make it clear that our interest in enhanced relationships is reciprocated:

1. Propose visits to Iran by carefully selected scholars and public figures. Whenever possible, the visits will be privately arranged. Individuals should have credibility and relevance to present-day Iran.
2. Encourage invitations to Iranian Islamic scholars and, possibly, Iranian religious figures to the Hejira anniversary celebrations in the United States. Events during the visit should also include similar representatives from other Islamic societies to stress the multi-national nature of the observances. Sponsorship should be privately arranged with the Hejira Anniversary Committee playing a major role.
3. Discuss with private entities, such as the Johnson Foundation or university-based seminars including the East-West Center, bringing groups of Iranian scholars to the United States to consider non-controversial topics. Preferably the meetings should be multi-national. Possible fields are literature, creative writing or, more pragmatically, library development and library science.
4. Work with a few carefully selected foreign student advisers and admissions officers at universities sophisticated in handling Islamic and Iranian students
 - a) to assess during this period of change in Iran evolving needs and attitudes of Iranian students so as
 - b) to look toward plans for a possible student conference or other type dialogue in the United States at some future propitious date.

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5. Explore with American educational institutions which take part in linkages or support other educational exchange operations in Islamic third-countries, such as those of the University of Nebraska at Omaha in Pakistan, possibilities for inviting Iranian students and academics to take part in such seminars or projects which foster intellectual understanding and on-going contact.
6. Consider augmentation of current ICA/IAS English-teaching and cultural institutions provided that administrative claims for past damages and sequestrations are given cognizance by Iranian authorities.
7. Be alert to opportunities to invite Iranians to take part in multi-regional exchange programs, particularly those in mass media.

NOTE:

The VOA confirms plans to increase broadcast time to Iran in Persian by one hour a day about the turn of the new year. It will add a thirty-minute morning show featuring news and news-related material and an additional thirty minutes to the front end of the current half-hour evening show. The extended evening show will provide greater opportunity for in-depth coverage and cultural material. Considerations cover: events in Iran outside the political sphere, a series on Iranian Islamic studies and Centers in the United States, and interviews with American scholars and Iranologists and appropriate public figures representing a wide spectrum of political and foreign policy viewpoints.

DISTRIBUTION:

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February 9, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR

FROM: NEA - R. T. Curran *AK*

SUBJECT: Weekly Report:
Iran — The Psychological Problem
and Some Solutions

This report updates you on the situation in Iran and what is being done about it —especially from an ICA perspective. It may be some time before Iran is fully able to resolve its political dilemma and establish a long term, viable government. However the present crisis is resolved, there are serious problems in Iranian perceptions of the United States which are likely to impede U.S.-Iran relations for some time to come. These problems are exacerbated by a pointedly anti-U.S. information flow both into and within Iran. The following outlines the problem and identifies action taken and proposed.

The Problem

Many Iranians, with their xenophobia showing, are describing U.S. influence as all-pervasive and all-powerful. Long a traditional mode of thought, this perception is now a heated mixture of fact, fantasy, wishful thinking, and dread, depending on who is talking from which perspective at which point in time. What seems especially vivid is the Iranian fear of American intervention.

Connected to this fear and certainly stimulated by it is a strain of strident anti-Americanism which, though it might well become more subdued in the long run, is likely to impede relations between our two countries. Anti-Americanism is rooted in 1) our support of the Shah and, by extension, the excesses of his government, 2) our identification with the now negatively perceived sense of westernization and materialism; 3) our image as arms purveyor and super salesman of the "expensive and the unnecessary" combined with a "colonialist"/"imperialist" image stemming from the former presence of thousands of Americans in Iran.

The anti-American themes are aided and abetted by the Soviet Union which is using its radio broadcasts and probably its local adherents to fan anti-U.S. flames.

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Action Taken and Proposed

NEA is participating in Under Secretary Newsom's Working Group. Among the actions being carried out are:

- A Persian language shortwave service on ICA's Voice of America (VOA) has been authorized and will be inaugurated in mid-March.
- At Working Group request, Secretary Vance has asked Foreign Secretary David Owen to intervene with BBC to allow VOA to use one hour of medium wave (standard broadcast) to transmit American news and views into Iran from a British transmitter on Masirah Island (off the coast of Oman). The shortwave and standard (if approved) broadcasts will give us an effective medium to deliver into Iran accurate news about U.S. intentions and policy, countering Soviet and clandestine broadcast distortions.
- ICA and State have begun giving special attention to funding broader intellectual contacts between Iran and the United States to stimulate the flow of accurate information in both directions.
- We are examining the lessons learned from the Iran debacle and have begun consulting with official (including DOD) and private American organizations to see if remedial measures are needed —especially regarding the size and intrusiveness of the American presence — in other countries of the region.
- State and ICA are considering assignments to Iran of American Persian scholars who might establish special relationships with the more conservative religious elements.
- ICA will emphasize areas with which Iran's new leadership can identify —philosophy, law, comparative religion, sociology, the problems of modernization, the politics of development, labor and agriculture. Emphasis will be on the commonality of our basic values.

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Tehran, Iran
December 24, 1978

Mr. John Golden
Quarry Hill, Incorporated
P. O. Box 9392
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear John:

Thanks for your qualified Christmas greetings and the copy of the article on Iran which you published in the National Defense journal. On this Christmas eve, the only caroling we hear is from a rather scruffy crowd of teen-agers marching by the Embassy and chanting "Yankee Go Home."

It has been some time since I have had the benefit of your views on the situation here, but I think both of us would agree that it deteriorated more rapidly and to a greater depth than we could have anticipated last year at this time. The worries which you and I used to share were addressed to a somewhat longer time-frame than has proved to be the case.

You have doubtless seen the many mutual recriminations abounding in Washington on "who lost Iran." Many of them touch upon the issue of the Embassy's access to dissident groups, particularly in the bazaar and among the religious. In that regard, I once again want to thank you for the assistance you gave to me in assisting our people to broaden their contacts in those two areas. I still, of course, remain frustrated in some measure about our inability to comprehend everything that makes these people tick, but at least in these days we do not lack voluble expressions of their often illogical viewpoints.

I hope you will visit us again in the new year and trust it will be a better one than the year just passed as far as Iran is concerned.

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With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

William H. Sullivan
Ambassador

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could get better terms in Europe and asked for a rate of only 0.375 point over LIBOR—a rate rejected by private Japanese banks. (S NF)

Late last month, Japanese businessmen countered with a proposal for the establishment of a \$10 billion special development fund to promote Chinese trade. The fund, no doubt blessed by Tokyo, would be underwritten by private banks with support from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Japanese Export-Import Bank, and the Japan Long-Term Credit Bank. Loans would be extended at average interest rates of from 5.0 to 6.5 percent. The Japanese are also exploring the possibility of offering Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund credits at rates of between 3.0 and 3.5 percent. The potential here is small, however, because total funding of the OECF is less than \$1 billion. (S NF NC)

Tokyo's efforts to pave the way for more imports of Chinese oil have been spurred by concern over the Iranian cutoff and the general vulnerability of Middle East supplies. The Japanese reportedly have just reached agreement with Beijing to spend \$2 billion on offshore development with repayment in oil if a discovery is made. Japanese oil companies claim they can handle only 200,000 b/d of the waxy Chinese crude without building new capacity. Tokyo has now decided to fund a 100-b/d test facility to process Chinese crude and is preparing to compensate refiners for conversion costs. The government seems determined to buy whatever crude the Chinese have to offer despite industry objections. Before going ahead with any refinery conversion program, however, Tokyo will require firm evidence from Beijing that it can supply the large amounts of crude presently under discussion. (S NF NC)
(Secret Noform-Nocontract)

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IRAN: EXPOSURE OF FOREIGN SUPPLIERS TO IMPORT CUTBACKS (U)

The political crisis in Iran already has curtailed imports and triggered cancellations of some major contracts for future delivery. Even if the new Khomeini-backed regime succeeds in restoring order, imports are unlikely to return to anywhere near the \$18 billion annual rate of a few months ago. Foreign exchange constraints as well as new economic priorities point to a much smaller Iranian market for foreign goods. This article surveys the exposure of foreign suppliers to an Iranian import cutback; it does not attempt to estimate the extent of sales losses or the impact on particular industries. (C)

Supplier Role of the Developed Countries

The developed countries have been by far Iran's largest suppliers, providing 55 percent of total imports; the less developed countries contributed roughly 10 percent

Japan: Industrial Projects Contracted With China During 1978

Facility	Location	Annual Capacity	Estimated Cost	Principal Japanese Firm	Remarks
Metals					
Bozhou steel complex	Shanghai	3 million tons	\$2,100 million	Nippon Steel	For 1981 startup—eventual annual capacity 10 million tons
Thermal power station	Shanghai	600,000 kw	\$350 million	Tokyo Electric	For 1980-81 startup—subsequent of Bozhou project
Copper anode	NA ¹	200,000 tons	NA	Sumitomo Metal Mining	Turnkey project for partial operation in 1981
Aluminum anode	NA	80,000 tons	\$160 million	Nippon Light Metal	
Chemicals					
Petroleum hydrocracking	Guangdong (S)	60,000 b/d	\$85 - \$175 million	Japan Gasoline	For 1981 startup
Catalytic dewaxing plant	Shanghai	NA	\$15 million	NA	For installation of Shanghai Refinery
Terephthalic acid plant	Shanghai	235,000 tons			
Acetone plant	Beijing	50,000 tons	\$305 million		
Polyethylene plant	Nanjing (S)	290,000 tons			
Ethylene plant	Beijing	300,000 tons	\$60 million	Japan Gasoline	For 1981 startup
	Daxing	300,000 tons	\$125 million		
	Jilin	115,000 tons	\$10 million	Mitsubishi	
	Nanjing (S)	600,000 tons	NA	C. Itoh	
	Shanghai	300,000	NA	C. Itoh	
	oil field	300,000	NA		
	Zhejiang (S)	600,000 tons	\$250 million	Mitsubishi	
Ammonia plant					
	Nanjing	300,000 tons	NA	Mitsubishi	
	Nanjing	300,000 tons	NA		
	NA	180,000 tons	\$375 million	Kaneko	
	NA	530,000 tons	\$35 million	C. Itoh	
	Shanghai	10,000 tons	\$50 million	Mitsubishi	
	Qingdao	NA			
	Nanjing	300,000 tons	\$100 million	Koyo Engineering	
	Qingdao	300,000 tons	NA	Sanki Chemical	
	NA	13,000 tons	\$30 million	Chiyodo and Chikuma	
	Shanghai	NA	\$60 million	Toyo Engineering	
	Nanjing	200,000 tons	\$30 million	NA	
	Qing	NA	\$40 million	Toyo Engineering	
	NA	NA	\$50 million	Toyo Engineering	
	NA	300,000 tons			
	Shanghai	3 million square meters	\$40 million	Kumagai	For 1981 startup
	Xianyang	1 million sets	\$230 million	Hitachi, Toshiba	Associated IC plant awaiting COCOM approval. Other manufacturing facilities for cathode ray tubes, shadow masks, glass covers, fluorescent materials
Truck plant	NA	100,000 vehicles	NA	Mitsubishi	6- to 13-ton trucks—contract reportedly signed but not confirmed

¹ Not available

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and the Communist countries about 5 percent.* Manufactured goods comprised the lion's share of imports; foodstuffs accounted for 13 percent and raw materials for 6 percent. The commodity composition differed markedly by exporting group in 1977; only 8 percent of imports from developed countries were foodstuffs, and two-third of these came from the United States. Almost half of LDC sales were foodstuffs (U).

The United States, West Germany, and Japan have held the largest market shares. In 1977-78, the United States supplied 24 percent of Iranian imports from the major developed countries; West Germany, 22 percent; and Japan, 18 percent. Other important developed country suppliers included the United Kingdom (9 percent), Italy (8 percent); and France (5 percent). Manufactures accounted for more than 90 percent of developed country exports to Iran, with capital-intensive products predominating. The key sales items, in order of value, were industrial and electrical machinery, motor vehicles and parts, iron and steel, chemicals, and aircraft. (U)

Iran as an Export Market

Export from the United States to Iran grew from \$2.7 billion in 1977 to an

OECD: Iran as an Export Market

	Percent of Total Exports		Iran's Market Ranking		Exports (Million US\$)	
	1978 ¹	1977	1978 ¹	1977	1978 ¹	1977
Total ²	1.9	1.7	12	14	11,575	11,812
Japan	3.1	2.4	6	11	2,219	1,926
United States	2.7	2.3	9	12	2,802	2,731
Italy	2.2	2.0	11	12	792	887
West Germany	2.4	2.3	10	11	2,478	2,740
United Kingdom	2.1	2.0	14	15	1,078	1,143
Spain	2.1	1.1	12	19	192	109
Switzerland	1.8	2.1	13	12	302	365
Finland	1.2	1.2	14	13	71	99
France	1.2	1.2	11	15	702	682
Sweden	1.1	1.0	18	19	160	197
Austria	1.0	1.1	18	17	82	110
Denmark	0.8	0.9	15	15	68	90
Belgium/Luxemburg	0.8	0.6	11	12	255	241
Ireland	0.7	0.4	17	19	24	20
Netherlands	0.6	0.7	15	15	235	318
Norway	0.3	0.3	32	32	21	25
Canada	0.3	0.3	20	19	87	138

¹ Data include only three quarters.

² Aggregate data for the OECD include only those countries listed in the table.

Unclassified

* From Iranian data for 1977. Information in subsequent paragraphs comes primarily from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) country data on trade with Iran and covers most of 1978.

annual rate of \$3.7 billion in the first nine months of 1978, accounting for 2.7 percent of total US exports. Manufactured goods made up about four-fifths of the total and agricultural products most of the rest. The US aircraft industry sold nearly 8 percent of its commercial exports to Iran, the largest share for any US industry. Should Iran cancel orders for commercial aircraft, the impact would be softened by the industry's strong order backlog and a willingness of other customers to move up their delivery dates. Sales to Iran also accounted for a significant share—about 3 percent—of total US exports of iron and steel and industrial machinery. (U)

US military goods deliveries to Iran declined substantially last year because of a fall off in deliveries of aircraft and missiles, which together accounted for about 90 percent of total shipments in 1977. Shipments of ammunition and vehicles, on the other hand, jumped in 1978. Given the phased delivery of big-ticket items such as aircraft, the value of military deliveries varied widely from quarter to quarter. (C)

US firms further increased their exposure in Iran in 1977-78 by signing an estimated \$4.5 billion in new contracts.* The largest contracts were for military goods

United States: Deliveries of Military Goods and Services to Iran¹

	1977				1978		
	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr
Total	527,002	715,920	585,741	537,753	356,980	572,768	325,017
Goods	386,136	611,609	378,421	355,882	285,648	450,013	223,604
Aircraft	240,342	561,381	250,448	258,109	163,408	248,486	118,146
Ships	1,118	874	1,412	633	1,930	226	835
Vehicles	13,653	4,964	5,003	1,841	3,206	38,453	6,183
Weapons	4,741	998	4,484	5,818	460	763	1,641
Ammunition	55,166	9,438	6,494	25,539	20,831	93,582	18,469
Missiles	60,429	28,577	98,622	38,051	72,655	57,535	57,090
Communications equipment	3,748	1,810	5,486	14,477	4,598	2,386	11,566
Other equipment	6,939	3,567	6,672	11,414	18,560	8,582	9,674
Services	140,866	104,311	216,740	181,871	71,332	122,755	101,413
Repair and rehabilitate equipment	1,857	3	19,485	15,825	467	1,474	5,885
Supply operations	22,872	7,809	Negl	19,417	15,108	13,341	7,397
Training	23,904	11,848	22,353	28,808	3,053	24,273	26,208
Other ²	92,233	84,651	174,902	117,821	52,704	83,667	61,923

¹ Foreign Military Sales (MFS) deliveries including support equipment. Values for military exports are not comparable with those for total US exports in the other tables because separate reporting systems are used.

² Includes technical services.

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* Information on new contracts is incomplete, and value figures should be treated as minimums. Joint contracts are counted in the data for only one of the principal countries.

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and services, communications networks, and construction projects. In addition, contracts valued at about \$2.7 billion for highway construction were won by joint French-US ventures. (U)

Military suppliers have been hardest hit by contract cancellations. Roughly \$7 billion in outstanding US military contracts for weapons purchases were canceled by the Bakhtiar government to save foreign exchange and to curb the large military buildup. Major contracts canceled included the F16 fighters, air warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, two Spruance class destroyers, and RF4E reconnaissance aircraft. Sales of missiles and armored vehicles will also be reduced. Iran will initially pay termination and default charges on contracts it cancels from a trust fund Tehran has established with the US Government. If weapons originally ordered by Iran can be sold to other buyers, Iran could receive some repayment. (U)

West Germany's exports to Iran of \$2.7 billion in 1977 and \$2.5 billion in the first three quarters of 1978 represent about 2 percent of its total exports. More than 300 West German companies with a total of 10,000 German employees operated facilities in Iran, ranging from sales offices to major manufacturing plants and construction sites. West German firms reportedly received contracts worth about \$700 million in 1977-78, about three-fourths for power projects. (U) 02

Loss of the Iranian market would be particularly troublesome for the depressed steel and nuclear reactor industries. Few companies, however, would lose money on existing contracts because of the widespread use of export and investment insurance financed by the West German Government. Two major companies—Kraftwerk Union and the Krupp conglomerate—could be severely affected by changes in Iranian industrialization policies. Kraftwerk Union, which has a \$5 billion contract to build two nuclear power plants at Bushehr, has substantial unused capacity; cancellation of the Bushehr project would push the company further into the red at a time when world demand for nuclear power plants is low. Recently, construction was halted at the Bushehr site because of material shortages. Krupp may be better able to maintain its position in Iran than other industrial firms because the Iranian Government owns 25 percent of Krupp stock. A new Iranian Government, however, might take a more active part in Krupp's management and try to cut the average annual \$175 million profit on Iranian deals. (C)

Japan, which sold goods to Iran worth \$1.9 billion in 1977 and \$2.2 billion in the first nine months of 1978, stopped issuing export bills to Iran last month. No goods destined for Iran have been shipped since then presumably because the Iranians are not paying for them. In 1977 Japanese sales to Iran accounted for 5 percent of Tokyo's global iron and steel exports, 7 percent of its total metal manufactures exports, and 4

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OECD: Share of World Commodity Exports Shipped to Iran, 1977

Commodity	OECD	Selected OECD Countries								Percent
		United States	West Germany	Japan	United Kingdom	Italy	France	Switzerland	Spain	
Total ¹	1.7	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.0	2.0	1.1	2.1	1.1	
Food	1.1	2.2	0.5	0.3	1.0	0.1	0.7	2.8	0.2	
Raw materials	0.3	0.3	1.0	3.0	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.3	0	
Manufactures	2.0	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.2	2.3	1.2	2.1	1.4	
Chemicals	1.2	1.0	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.6	0.7	1.6	0.7	
Semifinished	1.8	1.6	2.0	4.5	1.1	2.5	1.0	1.6	2.8	
Wood, lumber	2.2	1.8	3.8	3.1	5.8	4.0	0.8	4.5	2.5	
Paper	0.9	1.2	0.9	1.2	0.8	0.9	0.5	0.8	1.3	
Textiles	1.7	0.6	1.5	4.2	1.3	1.1	0.8	1.8	3.5	
Iron, steel	2.3	2.9	2.2	4.5	1.5	2.5	1.0	1.2	4.0	
Nonferrous	1.1	0.5	2.0	5.7	0.7	1.8	0.2	3.2	1.0	
Metal	3.4	3.5	3.0	6.6	2.7	6.0	2.2	2.2	2.9	
Other	1.3	0.7	1.1	3.3	0.9	1.3	1.0	0.8	2.1	
Machinery	2.8	2.3	4.2	2.2	3.2	3.8	2.4	1.9	1.3	
Agricultural	1.1	0.8	1.6	1.7	0.8	1.7	0.4	0.1	1.0	
Industrial	3.4	2.9	4.7	2.8	4.2	3.9	2.9	1.9	1.3	
Office	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.5	1.1	0.2	2.2	0.2	
Electrical	2.7	2.5	4.2	1.9	3.1	4.5	2.5	1.7	1.6	
Transport	1.7	2.7	2.0	1.6	3.0	2.6	0.8	14.1	0.2	
Motor vehicles	1.3	0.9	1.0	1.8	6.3	0.7	0.8	10.1	0	
Motor vehicle parts	1.6	0.6	4.3	1.7	2.8	0.9	0.7	0.9	0.2	
Aircraft	5.3	7.7	1.4	0	0.5	17.7	0.7	37.6	0	
Other	1.2	2.1	1.8	1.3	0.5	5.6	0.7	2.1	0.7	
Misc. manufactures	0.8	0.7	1.0	1.1	1.1	0.6	0.7	1.8	0.2	
Clothing	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.1	
Scientific instruments	1.2	0.9	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.4	1.4	
TV, radio, phonograph	0.6	0.2	0.6	1.0	0.2	0.2	0.4	1.2	0	
Other	1.0	0.7	1.0	1.7	1.6	1.0	1.0	2.9	0.4	
Other manufactures	6.8	13.3	2.5	1.1	7.3	1.5	0.1	2.9	0	

¹ Total values include data for the following countries: Austria, Belgium/Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and West Germany.

Unclassified

percent of its textiles exports. Japan will probably more than make up losses from a cutback in Iranian modernization by switching to China as a major market for Iran and steel exports. (U)

In 1977-78 the Japanese received \$1.1 billion in reported contracts from Iran; \$450 million were for power-related projects and \$120 million for construction of industrial facilities. The large Bandar Shahpur petrochemical complex being built by Japanese firms is not threatened by cancellation so far. Japan is anxious to negotiate a

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OECD: Exports to Iran, by Commodity, 1977

Million US \$

Selected OECD Countries

Commodity	OECD	United States	West Germany	Japan	UK	Italy	France	Switzerland	Spain
Total ¹	11,812	2,731	2,740	1,936	1,143	887	682	365	100
Food	817	488	30	3	40	2	68	30	5
Raw materials	300	33	37	34	18	10	8	1	0
Manufactures	10,795	2,305	2,673	1,890	1,085	875	608	344	103
Chemicals	771	106	230	60	103	51	47	57	5
Semifinished	2,505	189	448	938	139	259	139	57	78
Wood, lumber	77	10	17	4	7	10	3	3	3
Paper	127	18	14	6	8	4	5	1	2
Textiles	406	12	62	158	26	37	17	17	12
Iron, steel	887	80	151	470	26	60	45	3	28
Nonferrous	158	6	44	49	10	7	2	16	2
Metal	677	81	119	178	48	118	45	14	13
Other	238	18	41	72	15	33	22	3	18
Machinery	3,945	676	391	362	405	371	290	98	15
Agricultural	86	15	21	9	9	10	2	0	1
Industrial	2,527	607	959	213	264	224	183	67	8
Office	44	9	10	4	6	6	2	3	0
Electrical	1,289	245	402	136	127	131	104	28	5
Transport	2,080	548	445	390	263	139	89	66	3
Motor vehicles	684	53	124	204	155	18	46	6	0
Motor vehicle parts	508	45	254	45	93	14	22	2	1
Aircraft	608	430	16	0	8	65	9	57	0
Other	289	17	51	141	7	42	13	8	3
Misc. manufactures	572	55	112	133	63	54	41	61	3
Clothing	28	2	5	1	7	9	4	1	0
Scientific instruments	217	80	47	49	18	7	13	27	1
TV, radio, phonograph	73	2	10	33	1	1	1	1	0
Other	253	21	59	23	58	27	23	32	2
Other manufactures	896	633	57	8	112	0	1	6	0

¹ Total values include data for the following countries: Austria, Belgium/Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and West Germany.

Unclassified

new contract to cover the increase in costs of the project and to reestablish economic links with the new government. (U)

The *United Kingdom's* exports to Iran exceeded \$1 billion in 1977 and again in 1978, accounting for about 2 percent of total UK exports. The most apparent success has been in the arms field. Iran is Britain's largest arms client, and half of the \$700 million in new contracts in 1977-78 were for military goods. In 1977, UK sales to Iran

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accounted for 6 percent of motor vehicle exports and 4 percent of industrial machinery exports. Vehicle exports to Iran were particularly important to BL Limited (formerly British Leyland) and Chrysler UK, both ailing enterprises. Chrysler has laid off 1,500 workers because exports to Iran have been disrupted. (U)

Iranian contract cancellations will be a blow to UK exports. Plans for most of a \$1.5 billion British-built complex at Isfahan to manufacture guns, ammunition, and spare parts for tanks have been suspended by the Bakhtiar government. British arms export contracts totaling nearly \$2 billion also are in jeopardy. These include an \$800 million antiaircraft missile contract held by state-owned British Aerospace and a billion-dollar contract for Chieftain tanks held by the Royal Ordnance Factories of the Ministry of Defense. (U)

Italy's sales to Iran have been running at about \$1 billion, or 2 percent of total exports, in each of the last two years. Italian construction and engineering firms are heavily exposed, with orders totaling \$6 billion. Such orders have become a major factor in exports to Iran of industrial and electrical machinery and appliances, which totaled \$355 million in 1977. Eighteen percent of Italian aircraft exports—mostly helicopters—were destined for Iran. (U)

In 1977-78 Italian firms negotiated contracts with Iran valued at \$1.5 billion. Reported contracts for construction of a steel plant and port facilities worth \$600 million are part of a series won by government-owned concerns and associated with the \$3 billion Bandar Abbas Industrial complex. Helicopters valued at \$425 million and construction work worth \$200 million associated with the IGAT II gas pipeline are also to be provided by Italy. (U)

Accustomed to political unrest, strike activity, and bureaucratic delays, Italian firms supplying Iran are not panicking. Although payments delays are causing liquidity problems, work on most projects is continuing. The Italians are hoping that the new government, no matter how radical, will not abandon public works projects already under way. (U)

France's economic stake in Iran has been comparatively small since French firms have often lost major contracts to US, West German, and Japanese bidders. The French sold Iran goods worth about \$700 million in each of the last two years, just over 1 percent of total exports. Recently, however, France has led the developed countries in signing contracts with Iran. In addition to the joint French-US ventures, French firms won outright \$6.5 billion in new contracts, most signed in 1977. Roughly one-half were for electric power facilities, primarily nuclear. (U)

The nuclear power plant contracts, valued at \$2.5 billion to \$3.0 billion, were

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recently canceled by the Bakhtiar government. Construction of the power plants, to be built by Framatome and planned for completion in 1982-83, was already under way, and the company had hoped to win additional nuclear plant orders in Iran. Framatome is in financial trouble because of slowdown in France's own nuclear program and a decline in orders from other countries. Even though Framatome recently signed a letter of intent to build two similar plants in China over approximately the same period, cancellation of the Iranian project will seriously set back company plans. Most direct financial losses from the Iranian cancellation, however, will be covered by COFACE, the French foreign trade insurance company. (U) (Confidential/N. orn)

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SAUDI ARABIA: MORE MODERATE PACE IN DEVELOPMENT SPENDING (U)

As the end of the fourth year in Saudi Arabia's Second Development Plan approaches, we see mounting signs that the pace of development will be moderated. For more than a year unsettling experiences with inflation and the influx of foreign labor have led a substantial group in the Saudi hierarchy to question the wisdom of forced-draft modernization. Cautious statements concerning the follow-on Third Development Plan also have suggested that future plans for growth will follow more conservative lines. Last year's cash flow crisis, coupled with the Iranian upheaval, probably has clinched the decision for a more measured rate of economic expansion. (C)

The Rush To Modernize

Saudi Arabia's initial effort to accelerate the development process came with the introduction of the First Development Plan (FY 1971-75), which envisioned government expenditures of \$10 billion. With the sharp rise in oil prices of 1973/74, budget allocations during the latter years of the plan were expanded far beyond original targets, and actual spending in the period came to \$21 billion. The Second Development Plan (FY 1976-80) aimed at continued rapid growth through diversification of the economy's productive base, manpower training, expansion of social benefits, and development of roads, ports, and other supporting facilities. Planned government expenditures of \$142 billion were seven times actual spending during the First Plan. Even though budget allocations were not fully spent, the upsurge in actual government outlays led to a boom atmosphere with rapidly rising wages and prices. (U)

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SECRET

NO. 11552
TAGS:
SUBJECT: SHORTT TENNAN
ACTION: VI COUNCIL

NO. 11600: GLE

TAGS: ADIG

SUBJECT: INSPECTION MEMORANDUM

REF: STATE 103651

1. OVERALL US-IRAN RELATIONS ARE EXCELLENT. THEY HAVE
RECONFIRMED AND REINFORCED BY A STATE VISIT OF THE SPAN
WASHINGTON IN NOVEMBER AND A RETURN VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT
TEHRAN THE END OF DECEMBER. OUR RELATIONSHIP HAS CONTINUED
CENTER ON MUTUAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND COINCIDING VIEWS
ALMOST ALL ISSUES OF REGIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE
CONSISTENT WITH ITS GROWING POWER AND INFLUENCE, IRAN HAS
WILLING TO PLAY AN INCREASINGLY ACTIVE ROLE IN REGIONAL
AFFAIRS IN WAYS THAT BUTTRESS OUR OWN INTERESTS. ITS
CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNIFIL IS A RECENT EXAMPLE. ANOTHER
VITAL INTEREST TO US IS IRAN'S POSTURE IN OPEC AND ITS
COMMITMENTS TO STAND FAST WITH SAUDI ARABIA IN RESISTING

DRAFTED BY

DCM:JCM12105 EN

REVISIONS:

DRAFTING DATE

5/4/78

TEL. EXT.

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CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED

DCM:JCM12105

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CLASSIFICATION

(040)

... ADVISORY FROM ...
A CENTRAL ELEMENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN, WE HAVE
A BROAD MOSAIC OF OTHER INTERESTS AS WELL. OUR EXPORTS
OF NON-MILITARY GOODS TO IRAN ARE NOW RUNNING AT ABOUT A
2 BILLION DOLLAR PER YEAR LEVEL. OVER 150 OF THE
LARGEST US FIRMS AND 1000 AMERICAN AGENCIES IN THE COUNTRY AND
THERE ARE SOME 59,000 AMERICANS RESIDENT IN IRAN. A
US-IRAN JOINT COMMISSION TO PROMOTE US PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SECTOR COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF ENERGY, MANPOWER,
AGRICULTURE, TRADE AND FINANCE, AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
MET FOR THE FOURTH TIME IN WASHINGTON IN FEBRUARY UNDER
THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP OF SECRETARY VANCE. OVER 50
AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES HAVE LINKS WITH IRANIAN UNIVERSITIES
OR GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND THE IRANIAN STUDENT
POPULATION IN THE US IS NOW IN EXCESS OF 30,000. IRAN
CURRENTLY PROVIDES THE US WITH BETWEEN 8 - 9 PERCENT OF
OUR OIL IMPORTS.

3. IN A MAJOR SENSE IRAN HAS NOW REACHED THE POSITION
OF A STABLE AND MODERATE MIDDLE-LEVEL POWER WELL DISPOSED
TOWARD THE UNITED STATES WHICH HAS BEEN A GOAL OF OUR
POLICY SINCE THE END OF WWII.

4. THERE ARE NO OUTSTANDING ISSUES OF SUCH SERIOUS
MAGNITUDE THAT THEY NEED BE IDENTIFIED IN THIS MEMORANDUM.
OUR CONCERNS ABOUT STAFFING AND ADEQUATE FACILITIES FOR

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Classification

OPTIONAL FORM
(Form 1)

(OFF)

TO THE INSPEC. 12.

4. TEHRAN GOVT SETS OUT US GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN IRAN. MOST OF THESE OBJECTIVES ARE OPEN ENDED REGARDING CIVIL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS AN IDEAL OF A POLICY OF OPENING AND HUMANITY WITH THE IRAN. THE GOVT HAS STATED THAT WE HAVE PURSUED THESE OBJECTIVES WITH CARE AND SOME MEASURE OF SUCCESS. PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, EXPANDED CONTACTS, NUCLEAR ENERGY, COOPERATION IN REGIONAL, NARCOTICS CONTROL, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S ARMS SUPPLY POLICY ARE SOME OF THE MORE SIGNIFICANT AREAS COVERED.


SULLIVAN

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OPTIONAL - OF
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TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USICA 16052

USICA

EO 12065 GDS 4/5/85

SUBJECT: COUNTRY PLAN PROPOSAL

REFERENCE: TEHRAN 4826

CLASSIFIED BY: RICHARD H. CURTISS, DEPUTY DIR., NEA

1. (C) APPRECIATE YOUR BCR SUBMISSION AND BELIEVE A WORKING DOCUMENT IMPORTANT AND USEFUL. TOWARD THAT END, AND BASED ON YOUR THOUGHTS AND INPUT OF SNOW AND MCAFFEE, WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING AS RECOMMENDED BCR, ISSUES AND PROGRAM PLANS. DO NOT BELIEVE THAT PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES MAKE FEASIBLE PROJECT PROPOSALS AND SUGGEST THAT THIS PART OF CP BE HELD IN ABEYANCE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THEY MIGHT BE FEASIBLE. IN THE MEANTIME, BCR AND PROGRAM PLANS SHOULD OUTLINE EFFECTIVELY YOUR NEEDS AND PROBLEMS AS A BASIS FOR WHATEVER WASHINGTON SUPPORT SEEMS INDICATED AND WHATEVER POST ACTION SEEMS PRUDENT AND POSSIBLE. AT SUCH TIME AS YOU BELIEVE AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS CAN BE DRAWN WITH SOME VALIDITY, PLEASE FORWARD THAT TO NEA.

2. PCR

A. IRAN CONTINUES TODAY IN THE AFTERSHOCK OF THE REVOLUTION WHICH BROUGHT DOWN THE GOVERNMENT OF SHAH MOHAMMAD REZA FARLAVI. ARRESTS AND EXECUTIONS CONTINUE. UNEMPLOYMENT IS ESTIMATED AT OVER THREE MILLION, TRIBAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES ARE AGITATING FOR AUTONOMY, MINORITY RELIGIONS ARE FEARFUL, AND OPPOSITION POLITICAL GROUPS WRESTLE WITH WAYS AND MEANS TO PROMOTE THEIR INTERESTS AND THWART THE POLITICAL ASCENDANCY OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM.

B. AUTHORITY IN THE COUNTRY IS DIFFUSE WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN STRUGGLING TO ESTABLISH CONTROL AND WREST EFFECTIVE POWER FROM A WELTER OF LOCAL "COMITTEES" WHICH SPANG UP DURING THE REVOLUTION. REAL POWER IN IRAN CONTINUES IN THE HANDS OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS WITH THE CHARISMATIC HEAD OF THE REVOLUTION, AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, THE CENTRAL FIGURE.

C. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY WITHIN IRAN REMAINS LARGELY PARALYZED. IRAN'S OIL INDUSTRY WHICH IS ONCE AGAIN PRODUCING AND REFINING SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES TO MEET DOMESTIC NEEDS AND RESUME EXPORTS ON A REDUCED SCALE, VIRTUALLY ALL INDUSTRIAL

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ACTIVITY REMAINS AT A STANDSTILL. THE SPEED AND VIGOR WITH WHICH IT WILL EVENTUALLY REVIVE REMAINS UNCERTAIN GIVEN POLITICAL VICISSITUDES, PUBLIC ATTITUDES, THE FLIGHT OF CAPITAL PRECEDING THE REVOLUTION, AND THE DEPARTURE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF ESSENTIAL MANAGERS AND TECHNOCRATS (BOTH IRANIAN AND FOREIGN). RESULTANT UNEMPLOYMENT, ESTIMATED AS HIGH AS 3.5 MILLION OF A TOTAL POPULATION OF ONLY ABOUT 35 MILLION, COULD EFFECTIVELY THWART THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT'S RESTABILIZATION EFFORTS AND SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE THE FRAGILE POLITICAL EQUATION COUNTRYWIDE.

D. THE PROMISED NEW CONSTITUTION AND REFORMS TO REDRESS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRAN HAVE BEEN SLOW INCOMING. ALTHOUGH A DRAFT OF THE CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN PUBLISHED, ELECTIONS FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY TO CONSIDER IT HAVE BEEN POSTPONED. THE SAVAK PRISONS, WHICH WERE EMPTIED DURING THE REVOLUTION, HAVE BEEN REFILLED WITH PRISONERS ACCUSED OF A VARIETY OF CRIMES AGAINST THE PEOPLE DURING THE SHAH'S REIGN, OFTEN TO BE SUMMARILY EXECUTED FOLLOWING CLOSED TRIALS CONDUCTED BY "REVOLUTIONARY COURTS" OUTSIDE THE IRANIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM. POPULAR SUPPORT FOR SUCH TRIALS IS SUBSTANTIAL AND THE VEREMENT REACTION TO THE U.S. SENATE'S RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THEM SUGGESTS THE DIFFICULTY WE WILL ENCOUNTER IN PRESSING U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS.

E. CULTURALLY IRAN IS IN FERMENT. PART AND PARCEL OF THE REVOLUTION CAME A REJECTION OF WESTERN, AND PARTICULARLY AMERICAN, CULTURE. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAS ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION TO RESTRUCTURE THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM ALONG ISLAMIC LINES AND ERASE IT OF "DECADENT WESTERN INFLUENCES." IMPORTANT CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS HAVE BEEN CLOSED OR CONVERTED INTO SHOWCASES OF "REVOLUTIONARY CULTURE." IRAN'S HARD-WON SUCCESSSES IN ADVANCING WOMEN'S RIGHTS ARE BEING ERODED AS WOMEN ARE PRESSED

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TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 USICA 16052

USICA

EO 12065 GDS 6/5/85

TO RETURN TO THE TRADITIONAL VEIL OR "CHADOR" AND LEGAL PROTECTIONS AFFORDED THEM UNDER THE SHAH ARE THREATENED WITH RESCISSION. FOREIGNERS OF ALL SORTS ARE BEING EXPELLED FROM THE COUNTRY AS THE TIDE OF XENOPHOBIA RISES. AT THE SAME TIME, MANY IRANIANS CONTINUE TO RECOGNIZE THE INDISPENSABILITY OF SOME FORM OF FOREIGN CONTACT, AND MANY, PARTICULARLY THE WESTERN EDUCATED, OPPOSE THE MORE RIGID STRICTURES OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM. INTEREST IN STUDYING FOREIGN LANGUAGES, PARTICULARLY ENGLISH, REMAINS HIGH AND LARGE NUMBERS OF IRANIAN STUDENTS CONTINUE TO ASPIRE TO WESTERN AND U.S. EDUCATIONS.

IRAN'S FORMERLY CLOSE TIES TO THE UNITED STATES ARE CURRENTLY STRAINED ALMOST TO THE BREAKING POINT. EVEN THOSE TRADITIONALLY WESTWARD ORIENTED IN IRAN MUST, FOR THE PRESENT, ESCHUE VISIBLE CONTACT WITH US. IN A COUNTRY WHERE A "HIDDEN HAND" (GENERALLY THE U.S., THE SOVIETS, OR THE ISRAELIS) IS HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR EVERYTHING, THERE IS WIDESPREAD DISTRUST IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THE SUSPICION PREVAILS THAT THE U.S. IS ATTEMPTING TO FRUSTRATE THE GOALS OF THE REVOLUTION IN A VARIETY OF WAYS RANGING FROM EMPLOYING FORMER SAVAK AGENTS AS SPYAGENTS AND EMPLOYERS OF DISCONTENT AND FOMENTERS OF DISSENT AMONG MINORITIES TO KILLING IRANIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS. DESPITE THIS AND EVEN IN THE FACE OF THE CRITICISMS BY THE MODERN CLERGY, THOUSANDS AMERICAN-OWNED FIRMS EMPLOY FACTORS OF THE IRANIAN POPULATION IN THE PRIVATE AND MIDDLE CLASS. AMERICA, HAVING BEEN ONE OF THE LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTION, AND NOW HOME TO A LARGE NUMBER OF IRANIAN REFUGEES IS VIEWED IN GENERAL AS A "HIDDEN HAND" AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

THE FACTS, HOWEVER, INDICATE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE PAST OF HIGHLY RELIABLE INFORMATION FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. IRANIANS CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS ATTEMPTING TO FRUSTRATE THE GOALS OF THE REVOLUTION. COMMUNICATIONS ON A ONE-TO-ONE BASIS IS STILL

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SPONTANEOUS, CANDID AND OFTEN EVEN CORDIAL. BUT PUBLIC RHETORIC AS CONVEYED BY AN UNFORGIVING, OFTEN VITRIOLIC MEDIA, IS UNRELENTINGLY HOSTILE.

H. U.S. MISSION GOALS IN IRAN AT PRESENT ARE TO MAINTAIN AS OPEN AND COOPERATIVE A WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AS POSSIBLE DESPITE INVECTIVE FROM THE MEDIA, RELIGIOUS LEADERS, AND EXTREMISTS. ACHIEVING THIS GOAL IN A PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE WHEREIN THE USG (IN LEAGUE WITH THE U.S. MEDIA) IS ALLEGED TO BE AT THE ROOT OF ALL OF IRAN'S TROUBLES IS CONJECTURAL AT BEST, AND FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE IMAGE IRAN PROJECTS INTERNATIONALLY. THE U.S. MEDIA'S COVERAGE OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION HAS TENDED TO BE NEWS AND NOT ANALYSIS-ORIENTED, FOCUSING UNSYMPATHETICALLY ON WHAT IS WRONG. CLOSELY MONITORING SUCH COVERAGE LEADS RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES IN IRAN TO CONCLUDE THAT AMERICA DOES NOT WISH THEM WELL, AND, CONVERSELY, TENDS TO CONFIRM IN AMERICAN MINDS THAT IRAN IS A DISASTER IN EVERY SPHERE.

I. OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SHAH AND LONG-TERM SUPPORT OF HIS REGIME HAS NOT AND WILL NOT SOON BE FORGOTTEN. ITS LINGERING EFFECT IS TO CAST THE USG IN AN INTERVENTIONIST ROLE WHOSE PRACTICES BELIE ITS PRINCIPLES AND WHOSE PAST ACTIONS DENY IT THE MORAL AUTHORITY TO PASS JUDGMENT ON THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.

J. WHILE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS HAVE BEEN DWARFED BY IRAN'S DOMESTIC CONCERNS, ITS FOREIGN POLICY CAN BE EXPECTED TO REFLECT THE BIFURCATED STATE OF IRANIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THAT IS TO SAY, THE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN CAN BE EXPECTED TO MOVE AT A POLITICALLY FEASIBLE PACE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND WESTERN COUNTRIES AND, AT THE SAME TIME, TO REFLECT THE POLICIES OF THE AYATOLLAH AND BE SUBJECT TO HIS INTERFERENCE AT WILL. STATED AND EXPECTED POSITIONS INCLUDE:

-- DEEP ANTIPATHY FOR ISRAEL, CLOSE TIES WITH THE PLO, AND SUNDERING OF IRAN'S TRADITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE MODERATE ARAB STATES.

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SUPPORT FOR POLICIES FAVORED BY THE MORE RADICAL LDC'S IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FORA, INCLUDING PARTICIPATING IN THE NAM.

HAWKISH POSITION IN OPEC

ANTIPATHY TOWARD THE PRO-SOVIET REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN (SEEN TO BE ANTI-ISLAM).

K. IRAN'S ECONOMIC POLICIES, ASIDE FROM RESPONDING TO IMMEDIATE SHORT TERM NEEDS, AND REJECTING THE GOALS AND EMPHASIS OF THE SHAH'S GOVERNMENT, ARE NOT YET FULLY CLEAR. IT IS EXPECTED, HOWEVER, THAT IN ADDITION TO FAVORING THE POSITIONS OF THE MORE RADICAL LDC'S AND BEING HAWKISH ON OIL PRICES, THAT THEY WILL BE PARTICULARLY SUSPICIOUS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN IRAN, THE ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE RELEVANCE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO THEIR DEVELOPMENT NEEDS. DOMESTIC ECONOMIC POLICY IS LIKELY TO EMPHASIZE AGRICULTURE AND THE RURAL SECTORS WITH CONCENTRATED EFFORTS TO SHIFT ELEMENTS OF THE UNEMPLOYED URBAN POPULATION TO RURAL AREAS, INCREASE

IRAN'S AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND DECREASE THEIR LARGE FOOD IMPORTS. HOW THIS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED IS YET UNCLEAR.

L. IRAN'S ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS ONE YEAR AGO HAD SCORES OF AMERICANS TEACHING, CONSULTING, ADVISING, RESEARCHING. NO MORE THAN A HANDFUL ARE LEFT AND THE UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES IN THE AGGREGATE ARE FOR THE MOMENT ESCHEWING IMPORTED LECTURERS. WITH THE LARGE SCALE EXODUS OF QUALIFIED PERSONNEL, BOTH IRANIAN AND AMERICAN, THIS SITUATION MAY BE REVERSED, BUT CERTAINLY NOT UNTIL ANTI-FOREIGN, AND PARTICULARLY ANTI-AMERICAN SENSITIVITIES BECOME LESS ACUTE.

M. ONE OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATION LINKS WITH IRANIANS, BOTH IN TEHRAN AND IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION WAS THE BINATIONAL CENTER (IRAN-AMERICAN SOCIETY). BOTH THE ISFAHAN AND TEHRAN CENTERS EMERGED FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE UNSCATED (QUITE DEBATABLY, ONE MUST PRESUME), AND HAVE RESUMED ENGLISH TEACHING AND LIBRARY OPERATIONS (THE USICA LIBRARY IN TEHRAN

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IS LOCATED IN THE BNC). WHILE REVOLUTIONARY CADRES STILL OCCUPY THE SHIRAZ BUILDING, WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE GOVERNMENT CAN EFFECT ITS RETURN SOON AND THAT ENGLISH TEACHING CAN ALSO RESUME THERE. WE CONSIDER THE CONTINUANCE OF THESE INSTITUTIONS VERY IMPORTANT IN THIS EXTREMELY TENSE PERIOD OF U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS. THEY BECOME ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT WITH THE NECESSITY TO MOVE USICA OFFICES INTO THE HIGH SECURITY CONFINES OF THE CHANCERY GROUNDS. THE BNCS ARE NOW OUR ONLY WINDOWS TO IRANIAN AUDIENCES.

3. ISSUES AND CONCERNS

ISSUE ONE: IRANIANS HAVE A WIDESPREAD DISTRUST OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THE SUSPICION PREVAILS THAT THE U.S. IS ACTIVELY ATTEMPTING TO FRUSTRATE THE GOALS OF THE REVOLUTION, INTERVENING BOTH POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY. THE AMERICAN MEDIA, WITH THEIR UNSYMPATHETIC TREATMENT OF IRAN CONTRIBUTE TO AN IRANIAN PERCEPTION THAT AMERICA DOES NOT WISH IRAN WELL. FOR IRANIANS, LONG-TERM U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE SHAH HAS CAST THE U.S. IN AN INTERVENTIONIST ROLE WHOSE PRACTICES BELIE ITS PRINCIPLES AND DENY IT THE MORAL AUTHORITY TO PASS JUDGMENT ON THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.

ISSUE TWO: WITH MANY IRANIANS, AND PARTICULARLY THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP, THERE IS A REJECTION OF THE "MATERIALISM" AND "DECADENCE" OF THE WEST INCLUDING AMERICAN SOCIETY, CULTURE, THOUGHTS AND VALUES. PARTICULARLY SUSPECT IN VIEW OF OUR SUPPORT OF THE SHAH IS U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY.

ISSUE THREE: THE PGOI IS SHARPLY CRITICAL OF THE SHAH'S

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ECONOMIC POLICIES AND PRIORITIES, WHICH EMPHASIZED URBAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, CONSUMER GOODS, ARMS PURCHASES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND FOREIGN EXPERTISE. THE U.S. AS A MAJOR SUPPLIER IN THESE SECTORS WILL ENCOUNTER SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN ATTEMPTING TO NORMALIZE ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH IRAN. THE ROLE OF MULTINATIONALS AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPMENT, IF CONFUSED BEFORE, WILL BE FURTHER CLOUDED BY THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH THE ECONOMIC EXCESSES OF THE SHAH'S REGIME. IRANIAN HAWKISHNESS ON OIL PRICES AND REFUSAL TO CONSIDER THE IMPACT OF OIL PRICING ON AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ARE SERIOUS ISSUES FOR THE U.S.

ISSUE FOUR: WHILE DOMESTIC CONCERNS PREDOMINATE OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN TODAY'S IRAN, STATED AND EXPECTED POSITIONS OF THE IRANIAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WILL FURTHER AGGRAVATE ALREADY TENSE U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, IRAN WILL REFLECT A DEEP ANTIPATHY TOWARD ISRAEL AND U.S. MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS (SEEN TO BE IN ISRAEL'S INTERESTS). THE GOVERNMENT WILL BACK THE PLO AND HAS SUNDERED TRADITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE MODERATE ARAB STATES. THE REGIME CAN BE EXPECTED TO SUPPORT THE POLICIES OF MORE RADICAL LDC'S IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FORA, INCLUDING PARTICIPATION IN THE NAM.

4. PROGRAM PLANS

PRIORITY NO. 1. ISSUE: THE U.S. AND THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.

(1) THE U.S. SEEKS A COOPERATIVE AND OPEN RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN. IT WILL NOT BE PARTY TO ANY ACTIONS WHICH ARE DISRUPTIVE OR INTRUSIVE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF IRAN.

(2) THE U.S. ACKNOWLEDGES THE DEEP DESIRE OF THE IRANIAN MAJORITY FOR CHANGE. BORN OF A REVOLUTION OURSELVES, WE SYMPATHIZE WITH THOSE WHO LABOR FOR A MORE EQUITABLE AND JUST SOCIETY.

(3) U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES REFLECT THE ESSENTIAL FABRIC OF AMERICAN SOCIETY AND THE CORE OF OUR BELIEFS. OUR COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS IS OF TRANSCENDENT IMPORTANCE AND MUST SUPERSEDE SHORT TERM POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, EVEN AT THE

RISK OF ACCUSATIONS OF INTERVENTIONISM.

(4) THE AMERICAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF IRAN HAS TENDED TO BE NEWS AND NOT ANALYSIS ORIENTED RESULTING IN PERCEPTIONS OF A LESS THAN POSITIVE IMAGE OF IRAN'S REVOLUTION IN THE U.S. NONETHELESS, U.S. MEDIA HAVE ATTEMPTED TO ADHERE TO FACTS AS THEY SEE THEM AND HAVE SOUGHT TO REPORT EVENTS OBJECTIVELY.

(5) THERE WAS WIDESPREAD SYMPATHY FOR IRAN'S REVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES. THIS CONTINUES TO BE THE CASE, BUT SYMPATHY, BOTH IN THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONALLY, HAS BEEN ERODED BY IRAN'S ON-GOING SECRET TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS.

PRIORITY NO. 2. ISSUE: AMERICAN SOCIETY, CULTURE AND VALUES; RELEVANCE TO IRAN

(1) RELIGION AND SPIRITUALISM IS A PART OF THE WEAVE OF AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY. AMERICA HAS A HISTORY OF RESPECT AND TOLERANCE FOR ALL RELIGIONS. ISLAM, IF LESS WELL KNOWN TO MOST AMERICANS, ENJOYS EQUAL RESPECT AND IS THE SUBJECT OF SCHOLARLY INTEREST IN OUR PREMIER ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS.

(2) U.S. ADVANCES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ARE A POSITIVE FORCE IN AMERICAN LIFE. THEY HAVE FREED THE INDIVIDUAL FROM MUCH THAT WAS DRUDGERY, AND ELEVATED THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF ALL SECTORS OF OUR POPULATION.

(3) AMERICAN CULTURE IS RICH IN CONTRIBUTIONS TO RELIGIOUS THOUGHT, PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE, THE ARTS.

(4) AMERICAN EDUCATION IS EGALITARIAN AND WORKS TO SERVE ALL SECTORS OF OUR POPULATION. ITS PREMISE AND INNOVATIONS HAVE RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WORKING TO IMPROVE THEIR EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS.

(5) U.S. SCHOLARSHIP IN IRAN IS EQUAL TO THE BEST IN ANY COUNTRY OUTSIDE IRAN.

(6) THERE IS IN IRAN WIDESPREAD IGNORANCE OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM, WHICH IS BASED ON FEDERALISM, SEPARATION OF POWERS, CHECKS AND BALANCES, AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM IS AN EFFORT TO PRESERVE THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND BALANCE PRIVATE INTERESTS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD.

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(7) BASIC AMERICAN VALUES INCLUDE A BELIEF IN HARD WORK, HONESTY, OPTIMISM CONCERNING MAN'S ABILITY TO IMPROVE HIS LIFE AND THE WORLD AROUND HIM, A COMMITMENT TO EQUALITY AND FAIR PLAY, LOYALTY TO FRIENDS AND FAMILY, BELIEF IN THE WORTH OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL AND THE SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE, CHARITY AND COMMUNITY SERVICE. THESE ARE NOT VALUES UNIQUE TO THE UNITED STATES, NOR ARE THEY ALWAYS FOUND IN EQUAL MEASURE IN ALL AMERICANS, BUT THEY SUGGEST DIMENSIONS OF THE AMERICAN CHARACTER BEYOND AND ABOVE "DECADENCE" AND "MATERIALISM".
PRIORITY NO. 3. ISSUE: U.S.-IRAN ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.

(1) OIL IS A CRITICAL COMMODITY WORLDWIDE AND OIL PRICES HAVE AN IMMEDIATE AND MULTIPLIER EFFECT ON A RELATIVELY FRAGILE WORLD ECONOMY. HIGH OIL PRICES AFFECT MOST SEVERELY THE ECONOMIES OF POOR AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

(2) FOREIGN INVESTMENT CAN BE A VERY POSITIVE FORCE IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. IT WAS CENTRAL TO U.S. ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL GROWTH. SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE U.S. CONTINUES TODAY AND IS WELCOME FOR THE CAPITAL AND EMPLOYMENT IT PROVIDES. AND FOR THE INVESTMENT IN U.S. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STABILITY IT REPRESENTS.

(3) MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ARE A VERY EFFICIENT AND COST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF TRANSFERRING TECHNOLOGY AND STIMULATING INDUSTRIAL GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT.

(4) ONE OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE SECTORS OF THE U.S. ECONOMY IS AGRICULTURE. THE U.S. IS VERY WILLING TO SHARE WITH ~~IRAN~~ ~~LEARN~~ BOTH ITS EXPERIENCE AND ITS TECHNOLOGY.

PRIORITY NO. 4. ISSUE: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

(1) THE U.S. IS STRONGLY COMMITTED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS TO A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INVOLVING ALL OF THE PARTIES TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.

(2) THE U.S. SUBSCRIBES TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL COUNTRIES IN WESTERN ASIA. OUR CONCERN IS FOR REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY.

(3) THE U.S. IS SYMPATHETIC TO THE SENSITIVITIES AND NEEDS OF

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LEDC'S AND ACTIVELY SUPPORTS THE PRINCIPLE OF MAJORITY RULE,
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND A MORE EQUITABLE WORLD ECONOMIC
ORDER.

5. ADVISE CONCURRENCE.

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INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DAHBI

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

USINT BAGHDAD

AMEMBASSY BAHRAIN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PEKING

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

AMEMBASSY RABAT

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY TELAVIV

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY TUNIS

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E.O. 12065: XDS 5/10/89 (NAAS, CHARLES) OR-M

TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, IR

SUBJ: FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PROVISIONAL ISLAMIC GOVERN-
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CLEARANCE: ICA: JSHELLENBERGER

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REF: (A) TEHRAN 4377(NOTAL), (B) STATE 106426(NOTAL), (C) TEHRAN 4302(NOTAL), (D) TEHRAN 4314(NOTAL), (E) TEHRAN 4679(NOTAL)

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT) THIS IS A REPORTING CABLE.

2. SUMMARY: JUST AS THE GOVERNANCE OF IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS IS DIVIDED BETWEEN THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL STRUCTURE, SO IS THE DIRECTION OF IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY. THAT POLICY IS LIKELY TO OSCILLATE BETWEEN EXTREME ISLAMIC RHETORIC AND SUPPORT FOR RADICAL CAUSES AND MORE CONSERVATIVE, GEO-POLITICAL, NATIONAL INTEREST-BASED BEHAVIOR. DISTINCTIVE HALLMARKS AS SEEN FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA WILL BE A STRONG TILT TOWARD THE RADICAL AND AWAY FROM THE MODERATE ARABS, STEADY ATTACKS ON ISRAEL AND ZIONISM, CONTINUED SUSPICION OF THE GREAT POWERS ON A VERBAL PLANE, COUPLED WITH THE DESIRE TO DO DEALS ON GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT BASIS, AND A MORE LDC-ORIENTATED LINE IN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. THESE DUAL PATTERNS WILL LAST AT LEAST UNTIL THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IS ESTABLISHED OR THE PGOI IS REPLACED. OUR ABILITY TO MODERATE IRAN'S MORE RADICAL POLICY POSITIONS IS VERY LIMITED AT THIS TIME. END SUMMARY.

3. IRAN'S GOVERNMENTAL APPARATUS IS DIVIDED BETWEEN THE FORMAL PROVISIONAL ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT HEADED BY PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN, AND A STRUCTURE OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES LED BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND LEADING RELIGIOUS FIGURES (REFS C AND D). THE COMMITTEE STRUCTURE OPERATES LARGELY INDEPENDENTLY OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND KHOMEINI HIMSELF GIVES ORDERS TO BOTH. THERE ARE FREQUENT CONFLICTS BETWEEN THESE TWO PARALLEL STRUCTURES, AND THESE ARE REFLECTED IN IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY. BAZARGAN AND MANY OF HIS OLDER GOVERNMENTAL COLLEAGUES TEND TO VIEW IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY INTERESTS IN TRADITIONAL GEO-POLITICAL TERMS. THE HISTORY OF IRAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS WEIGHS HEAVILY ON THEM. THEY ARE GENERALLY CONSERVATIVE MEN WHOSE PRINCIPAL QUARRELS WITH THE SHAH ON SUCH MATTERS WERE THE HIGH EXPENDITURES ASSOCIATED WITH HIS POLICIES TO THE NEGLECT OF DOMESTIC NEEDS, AND IRAN'S INVOLVEMENT IN MATTERS FAR BEYOND ITS BORDERS IN SUPPORT OF WESTERN POLICIES. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND

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SUPPORTERS SHARE TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE THE SUSPICION OF THE SOVIETS, BUT THEIR EXTERNAL VIEWS AT THIS TIME ARE PRIMARILY INFLUENCED BY HATRED FOR WHATEVER THE SHAH DID, MESSIANIC ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS.

4. CONTINUED CONFLICT BETWEEN THESE TWO VIEWS WILL BE A FUNCTION OF THE REGIME'S INTERNAL STRUGGLES AND EVOLUTION. SHOULD THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN THE COMMITTEES AND THE FORMAL GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE EASE OR FADE AWAY, THEN RHETORIC AND BEHAVIOR WILL PROBABLY BE SYNTHESIZED TO A GREATER DEGREE. IF CONFLICT DOES NOT ABATE, THIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE REFLECTED IN IRAN'S POSTURE ABROAD, AND THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS WILL LAST AT LEAST UNTIL AN ISLAMIC CONSTITUTION IS FINALLY ESTABLISHED OR UNTIL THE PGOI IS OVERTHROWN OR ITS BEHAVIOR MODIFIED BY OTHER DOMESTIC FORCES. THE APPOINTMENT IN LATE APRIL OF CLOSE KHOMEINI ASSOCIATE DR. IBRAHIM YAZDI AS FOREIGN MINISTER (REF A), REPLACING THE LARGELY INEFFECTUAL, SECULAR, NATIONAL FRONT LEADER KARIM SANJABI, WAS IN PART AN EFFORT TO GET SOME ORDER INTO THE IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY MECHANISM, BUT ALSO TO ENSURE THAT IRAN'S POLICIES WILL MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT THE WORLD VIEW OF KHOMEINI. AT THE SAME TIME, YAZDI IS A MAN OF THE MODERN WORLD AND CAN PROBABLY UNDERSTAND, AND RELATE TO, BAZARGAN'S CONCERNS BETTER THAN MOST OF KHOMEINI'S CLOSE ADVISORS.

5. IN THE MONTHS AHEAD WE AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS WILL BE DEALING IN THE FOREIGN POLICY AREA WITH A SCHIZOPHRENIC AND UNSTABLE IRANIAN STRUCTURE. THE BASIC LINES OF POLICY, PARTICULARLY ON ISSUES WHICH ARE IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, WILL BE DOMINATED BY THE AYATOLLAH AND SUBJECT TO HIS INTERFERENCE AT WILL. (FOR EXAMPLE, HE ISSUED THE ORDERS PUBLICLY TO BREAK WITH EGYPT, WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT; THE FOREIGN OFFICE HAD TO PLAY CATCH UP.) IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY, THEREFORE, WILL BE MARKED BY:

- STRONG APPEALS FOR ISLAMIC UNITY;
- DEEP ANTIPATHY TO ISRAEL;
- CLOSE TIES WITH THE PLO;
- A STRONG TILT TOWARD THE RADICAL, CONFRONTATION ARAB STATES AND AWAY FROM IRAN'S TRADITIONAL SUPPORT OF THE MODERATE ARABS;

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- VOCAL SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RADICAL CAUSES THROUGHOUT THE THIRD WORLD, INCLUDING ZIMBABWE;
- ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES THE SHAH ABHORED, E.G., PDRY AND LIBYA;
- CONTINUED DEEP SUSPICION OF, AND OCCASIONAL HARRANGUES AT THE U.S. AND USSR;
- PARTICIPATION IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT;
- OUTSCREECHING THE HAWKS IN OPEC; AND
- SUPPORT FOR POLICIES FAVORED BY THE MORE RADICAL LDC'S IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FORA.

6. ON THE OTHER HAND, I EXPECT THE FORMAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE WILL ATTEMPT TO MOVE AT THE PACE IT BELIEVES POLITICALLY POSSIBLE TO NORMALIZE ITS BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH US AND THE OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. MY MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES CLEARLY INDICATE A DESIRE FOR ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL TIES, INCLUDING SPARE PARTS AND ADVICE IN THE MILITARY FIELD. ALSO, THIS GROUP IS LIKELY TO DO WHAT IT CAN TO PREVENT THE QUOTE ISLAMIC WING UNQUOTE FROM TAKING FINANCIAL OR MILITARY STEPS TO BACK UP RHETORIC. TO WHAT DEGREE THIS MORE MODERATE BEHAVIOR WILL REASSERT ITSELF IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL INTEREST AGAINST STERILE IDEOLOGY IS DIFFICULT TO GUAGE, AND DEPENDS MUCH MORE ON THE OUTCOME OF THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL STRUGGLE THAN IT DOES ON ANY FOREIGN ATTITUDE.

7. FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, I SEE NO QUICK OR EFFECTIVE WAY TO MODERATE IRAN'S NEW INTERNATIONAL EXTREMISM. AS OPPORTUNITIES ARISE, WE CAN TRY TO CHIP AWAY DIRECTLY AT THE MIND SET OF KHOMEINI AND HIS SUPPORTERS AND ARE INDIRECTLY DOING SO THROUGH PERSONS CLOSE TO HIM. OUR CURRENT POSTURE WITH THE GOVERNMENT IS ABOUT RIGHT. WE SHALL WANT TO BE RESPONSIVE TO ITS REQUESTS FOR POLITICAL INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE IN THE MILITARY SUPPLY AREA, AND BE AS POSITIVE AS LEGALLY POSSIBLE IN THE HOST OF CONTRACT DISPUTES WHICH ARE CERTAIN TO ARISE. IF THIS GOVERNMENT LASTS, IRAN'S GEO-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALITIES WILL SLOWLY REASSERT THEMSELVES TO PUSH US INTO A BETTER POSITION HERE. NAAS##

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Q. DOES THIS HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE
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Q. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
A. IRANIAN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

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THE REJECTION OF ALL AMERICAN STATE MEMBERSHIP
IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES BUREAU ON SEPTEMBER 1975 WAS A
GENERAL ASPECT OF THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC THAT WE
COULD NOT LOS SIGHT OF. ITS INEFFICIENCIES NOTWITHSTAND-
ING, THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT (HOMEINI) IS CREATING IN THE
MIDDLE EAST TO BE EVERY BIT AS DICTATORIAL AND REPRESSIVE AS
THE OTHERS. DESPITE THE RHETORICAL PREOCCUPATION WITH
FREEDOM, IT HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT FOR THE IRANIAN
HOMEINI HAS A MEANING QUITE DIFFERENT THAN THE WESTERN
CONCEPTION OF IT. IT DOES NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, ENCOMPASS THE
FREEDOM TO REPORT THE NEWS ACCURATELY IF ACCURACY IS
CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF ISLAM.

THE INTEREST IN IRAN TRANSCEND ANY PARTICULAR REGIME.
THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT TO MAKE WITH THE NEW RULERS BE UP IN
THEIR OWN MINDS. SUSPICIONS THAT WE CONTINUE TO COLLECT
INFORMATION FOR THE MOMENT. IT APPEARS THAT OUR
INTERESTS WILL BE SERVED THROUGH WORKING WITH THE
GOVERNMENT OF MEHDI BARZEGAN TO RE-ESTABLISH
NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S.
THAT WE WILL WANT TO TAKE A SIMILAR STANCE
WHEN THE GOVERNMENT IS IN PLACE, PROBABLY LATER
IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO CONCLUDE THAT
THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT IS GOVERNMENT OR ITS SUCCESSOR
IN THE CURRENT TREND TOWARD
AND REVERSED. WE MAY
IDENTIFIED WITH THE REGIME

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(02A)

12 NOV 1978

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C - COMPLY	F - FILE				N9				
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(01Y)

1978 NOV -6 PM 12:5

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

10828

FROM
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

ACTION:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO: ~~TEHRAN~~ BHAIIRAN

USINT BAGHDAD

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

ANKARA

DOHA

ISLAMABAD

JIDDA

KABUL

KUWAIT

LONDON

MANAMA

MUSCAT

NEW DELHI

PARIS

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

USINCPAC

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10828

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, PORS, PINT, PGOV, SHUM, IR

SUBJ: POLITICAL/SECURITY REPORT NOV 6

SUMMARY: SHARIF-EMAMI GOVT RESIGNED, HAS BEEN REPLACED BY MILITARY GOVT UNDER GENERAL AZHARI. TEHRAN MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION ISSUED TOUGH DIRECTIVE. CROWDS NONE-
THELESS GATHERING IN DEFIANCE, AND SOME INCIDENTS HAVE
TAKEN PLACE. AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI CALLS FOR CALM, WITHOUT
NEW MARCHES. ARMY SEIZED NIRT YESTERDAY. ARRESTS ARE

DRAFTED BY

POL: J. J. Perrett

DRAFTING DATE

11/6/78

TEL. EXT.

1187

CONTENT AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY

MIN: J. J. Perrett

CLEARANCE

POL: G. J. Lambros

POL: J. J. Stemp (contribution)

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CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FOR
(If approved)

Page

(026)

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Classification

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108-6

MRN

EXPECTED. EMB ADVISED ANCITS TO SAY HOME TODAY. SANJABI

KHOMEJNI JOINT COMMUNIQUE REJECTS COMPROMISE, CALLS

MONARCHY ILLEGAL. YESTERDAY'S DAMAGE WAS SELECTIVE AND

~~WIDESPREAD~~

~~WIDESPREAD~~. END SUMMARY

1. SHARIF-EMAMI GOVT HAS RESIGNED IN WAKE OF YESTERDAY'S

LARGE-SCALE RIOTING, TO BE REPLACED BY MILITARY GOVT HEADED

BY GEN QOLAM REZA AZHARI, CHIEF OF SUPREME COMMANDER'S

STAFF, AND ASSISTED BY CHIEFS OF INDIVIDUAL SERVICES.

EACH MILITARY CHIEF WILL SUPERVISE SEVERAL MINISTRIES,

WITH DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS IN HANDS OF CAREER UNDERSECRE-

TARIES. ^{ED} SHAH ~~WILL~~ ADDRESS THE NATION ^{LATE MORNING (SEPTIL)}

2. SHAH HAS TOLD AMBASSADOR PARLIAMENT WILL PROBABLY
BUT HE WAS NOT SURE (NOTE: SPEECH IN SEPTIL DOES NOT HAVE THIS).
BE DISSOLVED, AND THERE WILL BE ARRESTS OF DISSIDENTS,

BUT NO NATIONAL FRONT, PAN-IRANIST (PEZESHKPOUR) OR

BANI-AHMAD FOLLOWERS WILL BE ARRESTED. (COMMENT: THIS

^{might possibly}
~~APPARENTLY~~ LEAVES SUCH PROMINENT DISSIDENTS AS MINATCHI,

MOGHADAM, AND THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN LIABLE TO

ARREST.)

3. TEHRAN MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION THIS MORNING ISSUED

TOUGH NEW DIRECTIVE. REPEATING PREVIOUS ANNOUNCEMENT OF

NEW CURFEW HOURS OF 9 PM TO 5 AM, MLA RESTATED ORIGINAL

POLICY THAT GATHERINGS OF TWO OR MORE PEOPLE ARE PROHIBITED.

MARTIAL LAW VIOLATORS WILL BE WARNED BY AN OFFICER; IF

THEY DO NOT OBEY, TROOPS WILL FIRE ON THEM. ALL SCHOOLS

ARE TO REMAIN CLOSED THROUGH NOV 12. ~~REPEATED NO OF 1968~~

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50152-701

OPTIONAL FORM 152a (Rev. 1-61)
Formally FS-41 (Rev. 1-61)
January 1961
GPO: 1961 O-50152

~~TROOPS HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATED IN SOUTH TEHRAN~~
~~TODAY RELATIVELY FEW TROOPS ARE IN EVIDENCE AS FAR AS WE~~
~~AND NEAR UNIVERSITY~~
 EMBASSY HAS REPORTS OF FIRING NEAR ROUDAKI

HALL IN CENTRAL CITY AND HEAVY FIRING, INCLUDING AUTOMATIC
~~HOWEVER, MUCH OF FIRING HAS BEEN IN AIR~~
 WEAPONS, IN TEHRAN UNIVERSITY AREA. CAMPUS WAS LOCKED

BUT STUDENTS FORCED THEIR WAY IN. POLICE THEN DISLODGED

THEM, AND THEY ~~ARE CONFRONTING~~ ~~COOPERATED~~ TROOPS DEPLOYED IN

UNIVERSITY DISTRICT. PEOPLE ~~HAVE~~ ALSO GATHERED NEAR

BRITISH EMBASSY, WHICH WAS DAMAGED YESTERDAY, AND TROOPS
~~WERE SENT AT OUR REQUEST TO PROTECT~~
~~HAVE NOT APPEARED TO DISPERSE THEM~~ U.S. EMBASSY IS,

HOWEVER, UNDER MILITARY GUARD

4. ARMY ~~SEIZURE~~ ~~SEIZED~~ NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND

TELEVISION (NIRT). AND TODAY'S BROADCASTS INCLUDED VOICES

DIFFERENT FROM THOSE USUALLY HEARD. NIRT DIRECTOR HAS
 ONLY RASTAKHIZ NEWSPAPER APPEARED THIS MORNING.
 RESIGNED. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

5. PROMINENT DISSIDENT AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI WAS QUOTED

OVER GOVT RADIO AS APPEALING FOR CALM TODAY, TELLING

PROTESTORS NOT TO MARCH IN STREETS, WHICH RAISES QUESTIONS

AS TO WHO TODAY'S DEMONSTRATORS ARE.

6. SHAH CONSULTED WITH SEVERAL LEADERS, INCLUDING AMINI

AND ENTEZAM BEFORE AGREEING TO MILITARY GOVT. HE DID NOT

SEE BAZARGAN OR MINATCHI AND HAS INTERPRETED NATIONAL

FRONT POSITION AS INFLEXIBLE. EMBOFFS LEARNED AFTERNOON

NOV 5 THAT KARIM SANJABI HAD ISSUED JOINT STATEMENT WITH

AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IN PARIS, WHICH CONTAINED THREE POINTS:

A) THE MONARCHY WITH ITS PERPETUAL VIOLATIONS OF

(024)

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NNN

[CONSTITUTION, TERRORISM AND CORRUPTION MUST NOT BE
SUPPORTED. B) THE NATIONAL-ISLAMIC MOVEMENT CANNOT
APPROVE AN ILLEGAL MONARCHY. C) THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN
OUGHT TO BE BASED ON DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES "APPROVED BY
THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE". ("VOICE OF THE PEOPLE" WAS
TO
DESCRIBED/IN LOCAL PRESS XXXXXX BY NATIONAL FRONT SPOKES-
MAN AS "REFERENDUM OF THE PEOPLE," THOUGH NATIONAL FRONT
LEADER SHAHPOUR BAKHTIAR TOLD EMBOFFS AND VISITORS HE
THOUGHT IT MEANT MERELY FREE ELECTIONS.) BAKHTIAR'S
INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENT WAS THAT IT OPENED WAY FOR
POSSIBLE MODERATE RELIGIOUS PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT.
BUT PREDOMINANT LOCAL INTERPRETATION SEES TEXT AS
VICTORY FOR KHOMEINI. BAKHTIAR RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM
PARIS WHICH INFORMED HIM THAT RADICAL IRANIAN STUDENT
GROUPS, ESPECIALLY GERMAN CONFEDERATION, WERE "VERY
DISAPPOINTED" THAT KHOMEINI HAD "BEEN SO SOFT."
7. YESTERDAY'S VIOLENCE WAS SELECTIVE AND VERY HEAVY.
IN LARGE SECTIONS OF TOWN EVERY BANK WAS LOOTED OR BURNED.
TRAVEL OFFICES, MOVIE THEATERS, LIQUOR STORES AND SEVERAL
HOTELS WERE DESTROYED OR HEAVILY DAMAGED. RIOTERS ALSO
BURNED MANY BUSES AND AUTOMOBILES. MIN. OF INFORMATION
AMELI-TEHRANI WAS REPORTEDLY BEATEN WHEN MOB STORMED HIS
MINISTRY, SETTING IT ON FIRE. PUBLIC ORDER IN CENTRAL
TEHRAN COLLAPSED FOR SEVERAL HOURS. WHERE TROOPS WERE
PRESENT, THEY DID LITTLE OR NOTHING TO PREVENT ATTACKS ON

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

0142-201

OPTIONAL FORM 100-10
(Formary FS 413-10)
January 1971
Dist. C.

(JTT)

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BUILDINGS. CONSULATES TABRIZ AND ISFAHAN REPORT NO SPECIAL DISTURBANCES YESTERDAY. TABRIZ DID HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS BUT NO VIOLENCE. CONSULATE SHIRAZ REPORTS LARGE DEMONSTRATION NOV 4 AND ANOTHER YESTERDAY, THIS TIME RESULTING IN TROOPS OPENING FIRE. THERE ARE REPORTS OF TWO KILLED. TEAR GAS FORCED EVACUATION OF SAIDI HOSPITAL. TODAY LARGE CROWD IS GATHERING ON PAHLAVI UNIVERSITY CAMPUS.

SULLIVAN

(022)

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TELEGRAM

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☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

10835

FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN		CLASSIFICATION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE	
E.O. 11652:	ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC		
TAGS:	INFO: CONSENS CONSENS DHAHRAN		
SUBJECT:	USINT BAGHDAD		
ACTION:	AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI		
	ANKARA		
	BONN		
	DOHA		
POL: 3	ISLAMABAD		
	JIDDA		
AMB	KABUL		
MIN	KHARTOUM		
ECON	KUWAIT		
PM	LONDON		
ICA	MANAMA		
OR	MUSCAT		
SY	NEW DELHI		
ADM	PARIS		
DAO	USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE		
AFOSI	USCINCPAC		
CRU			
SCRO			
15	LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN		10835
E.O. 11652:	N/A		
TAGS:	PINS, IR		
SUBJ:	FIRST REACTIONS TO SHAH'S SPEECH		
REF:	TEHRAN 10817		
1. ONE OPPOSITION REACTION WE HAVE COMES FROM RELIGIOUS AND HUMAN RIGHTS SPOKESMAN MINATCHI. HE SAID SPEECH IS NOT BAD IF MILITARY GOVT IS SHORT AND LEAVES THE WAY OPEN FOR A NEW COALITION GOVT TO EMERGE EASILY. EARLIER IN THE DAY, NATIONAL FRONT'S SPOKESMAN HAD SPOKEN OF THE			
CHARTED BY:	POL: GBR/brakis	DRAFTING DATE 11/6/73	TEL. EXT. 1110 CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED MIN: CWN/as

CLEARANCES:

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CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM

(FORM 10)

Jm
Dept

50162-101

(021)

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MRN

NEED TO MAINTAIN UNITY AND CALM, REFRAINING FROM

"ILLOGICAL EXCITEMENT." This falls in the same category

as AYATOLLAH TALAGHANI (KHOMEINI SUPPORTER) CALL EARLY

TODAY FOR THE MASSES TO AVOID CONFLICTS SO AS NOT TO

BE BLAMED FOR ARSON, DESTRUCTION AND BLOODSHED..

LEADING

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ / OPPOSITION POLITICIAN MOGHADAM ALSO FELT

FINALLY, NATIONAL FRONT LEADER
~~XXXXX~~ SPEECH SEEMS ~~BEING~~ GOOD. / BAKTIAR TOLD US HE THOUGHT SPEECH
WAS "CALM AND REASONABLE."

2. AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN, PRESUMABLY REFLECTING REACTIONS

OF THEIR IRANIAN COUNTERPARTS, ESPECIALLY LIKED SHAH'S

REFERENCE TO RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF LAW AND ORDER. MEMBER

OF IRANIAN BANKING COMMUNITY SAW IN THE SPEECH A FIRM

HAND BY THE SHAH, HAVING LEARNED THE LESSON OF THE PAST.

3. LOYALIST LADY MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT THOUGHT THE SPEECH

GOOD, BUT NOTED ITS SIGNIFICANCE WOULD DEPEND ON HOW IT

IMPRESSED THE DEMONSTRATORS IN THE STREET. GOVT NEEDS

PRACTICAL MEASURES ~~IN~~ IN ORDER TO REGAIN ITS CREDIBILITY.

LONG TIME IRANIAN JOURNALIST NOTED ONE IMPORTANT ELEMENT

MISSING FROM OTHERWISE GOOD SPEECH -- NO MENTION OF

PUNISHMENT OF THOSE GUILTY OF PAST WRONGS. HE THOUGHT

OMISSION

THIS WOULD BE AN ~~OMISSION~~ THAT WOULD BE REMARKED UPON.

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OPTIONAL FORM 100
(Formerly FS-41)
January 1, 1963

4. IN BRIEF SAMPLING BY ICA OFFICERS OF SENIOR NATIONAL EMPLOYEES, A SENATOR, INTERNATIONAL LAWYER, SOME STAFF MEMBERS OF MINT, THE UNIVERSITY CHANCELLOR, A COLLEGE PROFESSOR AND TWO IRANIAN BUSINESSMEN, FOLLOWING WAS THE GENERAL CONSENSUS:

(A) SPEECH WAS GENERALLY APPEALING; IT IS GOOD THAT THE SHAH APOLOGIZED FOR PAST ACTIONS AND SUPPORTED CONTINUED MOVEMENT TOWARD DEMOCRACY;

(B) SPEECH SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE MONTHS AGO; MAY BE TOO LATE;

(C) MILITARY GOVT WILL NOT LAST LONG BUT MAY COOL THE SITUATION FOR TIME BEING;

(D) ALL DOUBTED ABILITY OF THE MILITARY TO RUN THE GOVT OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME DUE TO AX ITS INEXPERIENCE IN CIVILIAN MATTERS;

(E) THOSE WHO KNOW NEW PM PERSONALLY SPOKE HIGHLY INCORRUPTIBLE OF HIM AS AN HONEST AND/INTELLIGENT OFFICER.

5. A VERY SMALL SAMPLING OF COLLEGE STUDENTS FOUND THEM GENERALLY CYNICAL AND BELIEVING THAT YESTERDAY'S VIOLENCE WAS CAREFULLY STAGE-MANAGED TO PERMIT THE IMPOSITION OF MILITARY RULE. TO THESE STUDENTS, THE SHAH'S CREDIBILITY REMAINS VERY MUCH IN QUESTION.

SULLIVAN

(019)

RUCMHA

RUCMHA #47/1 1701430

CCCCC ZZH

191425Z JUN 79

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7136

3 RUCMHA/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 9525

TX/AMEMBASSY KAEUL 1826

TX/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1368

TX/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6112

HAD/USINT BAGHDAD 236

LEPA/AMCONSUL ADANA 9260

PL/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 8144

PL/AMCONSUL IZMIR 1468

FMHA/USMISSION USNATO 6054

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 4647

LINDIS

U.O. 12065 GDS 6/19/83 (SPIERS, RONALD) OR-M

TASS: PEPR, TU, IR, IQ

RE: (C) VISIT OF TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER TO IRAN.

1. C-ENTIRE TEXT. THIS IS AN INFORMATION MESSAGE.
2. SUMMARY: FOREIGN MINISTER OKCUN BELIEVES THAT A "GOOD DIALOGUE" HAS BEEN STARTED WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY IRANIAN REGIME. THERE WAS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON EXPANDING ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION, BUT FEW SPECIFICS. OKCUN FOUND THE IRANIANS INCLINED TO BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE US, BUT SUSPICIOUS. THEY WERE DOWN ON THE SOVIETS AND ISRAELIS. THERE WAS NO INTEREST IN THE RCD AND MORAL SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN REBELS. END SUMMARY.
3. AT AMBASSADOR'S REQUEST, FORMIN OKCUN PROVIDED AN EXTENSIVE FILL-IN ON HIS JUNE 9-11 VISIT TO TEHRAN. FORMIN SAID THAT THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF "STARTING A GOOD DIALOGUE" WITH REVOLUTIONARY IRANIAN REGIME HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AND THE BASIS LAID FOR BROADER ECONOMIC/TECHNICAL COOPERATION. THE IRANIANS APPEARED TO RECIPROCATE TURKEY'S POLITICAL WILL FOR CLOSER COOPERATION. HOWEVER, OKCUN FOUND IT HARD TO SAY HOW THINGS WOULD DEVELOP AS THE IRANIANS APPEARED UNREADY TO FOCUS ON SPECIFICS, SUCH AS ESTABLISHING A JOINT COMMISSION. THEIR PRIMARY CONCERN REMAINED INTERNAL RATHER THAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. WHILE THE IRANIANS ACTED AS IF THEY HAD FULL CONTROL, OKCUN WAS SKEPTICAL.
4. DURING HIS STAY, DEPPRIMIN AND FORMIN PARDI ACTED AS PRINCIPAL HOST AND WAS WITH HIM FOR THE LATTER PART OF ONE AND ONE-HALF DAYS. IN ADDITION, THE FORMIN MET FOR ABOUT 40 MINUTES WITH PRI IN KARABAGAN AND FOR ONE AND ONE-HALF HOURS WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. THERE WAS ALSO A PRIVATE MEETING WITH A NUMBER OF MINISTERS, INCLUDING THE HEAD OF THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL CO.

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-- KHOMEINI: A TOUCH-THROU ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY WHO APPEARED TO MAKE NO CONCESSIONS TO OTHER IDEOLOGIES. KHOMEINI REMINDED OKCUN OF ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS. HE APPEARED STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE WEST FOR CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS REASONS. THE SESSION WITH AYATOLLAH WAS UNUSUAL IN THAT TV AND NEWSMEN WERE PRESENT THROUGHOUT.

-- YAZDI: YAZDI HANDLED HIMSELF WELL. HIS APPROACH WAS "MODERN" BUT HAD STRONG UNDERTONES OF ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY. FOR THE MOMENT HE WAS THE LINK BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT, AND RELATIONS WITH THE PRIMIN SEEMED FRIENDLY. IT WAS UNCLEAR, HOWEVER, WHAT THE FUTURE WOULD BRING. OKCUN THOUGHT YAZDI WAS NOT ANTI-WESTERN AND WAS INTERESTED IN BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE US. (OKCUN'S AIDE, OYSEN, QUESTIONED THE MINISTER'S OPINION ON THIS POINT.)

-- BAZARGAN: AN ABLE ELDER STATESMAN WHO FAVORED COOPERATION WITH TURKEY. BAZARGAN WAS GLAD THAT A DIALOGUE HAD STARTED. HIS APPROACH SEEMED MORE SECULAR THAN THAT OF YAZDI.

-- SHARIAT MADARI: OKCUN'S FAVORITE AMONG THE IRANIANS. HE FOUND THE TURKISH-ORIGIN AYATOLLAH MORE DEMOCRATIC AND HUMANISTIC THAN KHOMEINI AND MORE INTERESTED IN BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO AYATOLLAS WERE POOR AND THAT THEY WERE QUARRELLING ON CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.

6. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES.

-- RELATIONS WITH THE US: OKCUN HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE IRANIANS WANTED TO ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE US, BUT WERE TERRIBLY SENSITIVE OVER MATTERS SUCH AS THE SENATE'S CRITICISM OF HUMAN RIGHTS. OKCUN URGED THE US TO PROCEED CAUTIONSULY IN A LOW KEY, TRYING TO ASSURE THE IRANIANS THAT COOPERATION WAS IN THEIR INTEREST. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING TO NAME A NEW ENVOY TO TEHRAN. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE IRANIAN REFUSAL OF AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE CUTLER, AFTER FIRST HAVING GRANTED AGREEMENT, WAS THE TYPE OF ACTION WASHINGTON FOUND HARD TO TALLOW. MOREOVER, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION HAD EXERCISED CONSIDERABLE RESTRAINT IN ITS COMMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN REVOLUTIONARY IRAN, ALTHOUGH IT HAD CRITICIZED THE SHAH'S GOVERNMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES.

(019)

A NEW CONSUL GENERAL TO ISTANBUL. OKCUM DID NOT EXPLAIN WHY THEY WERE SENDING A CHARGE RATEER THAN AN AMEASSADOR HERE.

-- JIL: OKCUM SAID HE WAS "SATISFIED" WITH DISCUS-
SIONS ON OIL SUPPLY, ADDING THAT 1988 MIGHT SHOW EXPANDED
TRADE IN OIL AND OTHER PRODUCTS. (ANKARA 4538)

7. COMMENTS: OKCUM'S PRIVATE IMPRESSIONS ARE LESS GLOWING
THAN THE EXTREMELY POSITIVE PRESS REPORTING ABOUT HIS
VISIT TO IRAN. THE RECEVIT GOVERNMENT CLEARLY IS
TRYING TO MAKE THE BEST OF A DIFFICULT SITUATION WITH
THE NEW REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. TIME WILL TELL HOW
MUCH SUBSTANCE FOLLOWS THE NICE SOUNDING WORDS ABOUT
ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION. SPIERS
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#4047

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(01V)

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RUQMER

RUQMGU #4547/2 1701430

NY CCCCC ZZH

P 191425Z JUN 79

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7137

INFO RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATEENS 9525

RUBLE/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1527

RUZMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1309

RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6113

RUHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 237

RUFLPA/AMCONSUL ADANA 9261

RUQMPL/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 8145

RUFLAA/AMCONSUL IZMIR 1489

RUFBNA/USMISSION USNATO 8855

BT

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 4547

LIMDIS

-- RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS: OKCON SENSED THAT THE IRANIANS WERE NOT WELL INCLINED TOWARD THE SOVIETS. ONE POINT OF CONTENTION WAS THE WIDESPREAD BELIEF THAT THE SOVIETS WERE ASSISTING DISSIDENT GROUPS. IN CONTRAST, OKCON NOTED THAT THE IRANIANS TOLD HIM THEY DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THEUS WAS CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN THIS TYPE OF INTERFERENCE.

-- ISRAEL: THE HARSHTEST ATTITUDE WAS AGAINST ISRAEL. FEELINGS WERE STRONG, AND IRANIANS BELIEVED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE COLLUDING WITH REMNANTS OF SAVAK TO STIR TROUBLE AMONG DISSIDENT GROUPS.

-- IRAQ: THE IRANIANS COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE IRAQI POSITION, ESPECIALLY ON KURDISTAN WHERE THE IRAQIS WERE BELIEVED TO BE ASSISTING DISSIDENTS.

-- AFGHANISTAN: THE IRANIANS SHOWED AT LEAST "MORAL SOLIDARITY" WITH THE AFGHAN ISLAMIC REBELS. THE IRANIANS SAW THE TARAKI GOVERNMENT IN DIFFICULT STRAITS.

-- WCD: OKCON FOUND THE IRANIANS NOT REPEAT NOT IN FAVOR OF USING THIS ORGANIZATION AS A VEHICLE TO PROMOTE REGIONAL COOPERATION. INSTEAD, THE IRANIANS WANTED TO DEAL BILATERALLY.

-- NEW ENVOY FOR TURKEY: THE IRANIANS WERE PLANNING TO ASSIGN A NEW CHARGE D'AFFAIRS TO ANKARA AND

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VZCZC 650

(010)

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DE RUQMHR #9174 2311005

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

R 191002Z AUG 79 ZDK CITE UR SVC 1015W

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3294

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 09174

USICA

E.O. 12065:N/A

SUBJECT: BUILDING CONCEPTUAL BRIDGES TO SHI'A ISLAM

1. AT PRESENT THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF CONFUSION IN IRAN. POWER IS DIFFUSED AT BEST, AND EVEN RELATIVELY SIMPLE DECISIONS OFTEN GET POSTPONED FOR WANT OF CLEAR AUTHORITY. IT IS THEREFORE IMPRACTICAL TO TRY TO MAP OUT MORE THAN A TENTATIVE POWER STRUCTURE WHICH IDENTIFIES SOME INFLUENTIAL GROUPS AND INSTITUTIONS. AND OF COURSE IT IS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO FORESEE WHO THE PLAYERS WILL BE A YEAR OR, MORE IMPORTANTLY, TEN YEARS HENCE.

2. IT IS, NONETHELESS, VERY MUCH IN THE U.S. INTEREST TO BEGIN, INSOFAR AS PRACTICAL, DISCREETLY AND CAUTIOUSLY BUILDING BRIDGES TO GROUPS WHICH APPEAR CERTAIN TO PLAY MAJOR ROLES IN IRAN DURING THE NEXT TEN YEARS. IRANIAN HISTORY, THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE DEPARTURE OF THE SHAH, AND THE SITUATION AT PRESENT ALL INDICATE THAT SHI'A RELIGIOUS LEADERS WILL CERTAINLY BE ONE GROUP WHICH WILL PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN IRAN REGARDLESS OF WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT, SOCIAL STRUCTURE, AND ECONOMY EMERGE FROM THE PRESENT FLUX.

3. WHILE IT IS EVIDENT THAT IRAN'S DEEP, GRASS-ROOTS ATTACHMENT TO SHI'A ISLAM MAKES IT CERTAIN THAT THE CLERGY WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE ENORMOUS INFLUENCE IN IRAN, IT IS EQUALLY EVIDENT THAT AMERICANS HAVE AT PRESENT LITTLE ABILITY TO RELATE TO THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK WHICH INFORMS THE ULAMA. WE DO NOT KNOW WHERE THEY ARE COMING FROM. CONVERSELY, THE ULAMA HAVE LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCEPTS WHICH UNDERLIE WESTERN THOUGHT. TO MAKE MATTERS WORSE, BOTH SIDES ARE BURDENED WITH A STOCK OF SUPERFICIAL INFORMATION AND MISLEADING GENERALIZATIONS.

4. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS NO QUICK WAY TO CLOSE THE COMMUNICATION GAP BETWEEN AMERICANS AND THE SHI'A CLERGY. IN THIS CASE, THE AMERICAN PENCHANT FOR CRASH PROGRAMS AND QUICK ACTION IS HOPELESSLY INAPPROPRIATE. RUSHING OUT TO TAKE A MULLAH TO LUNCH, SENDING THE CLERGY OUR PUBLICATIONS, OR EVEN DEVISING PROGRAMS WITH THEM IN MIND IS UNLIKELY TO DO MUCH BY WAY OF REDUCING THE COMMUNICATION PROBLEM.

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5. CONVENTIONAL EXCHANGES WHICH INVOLVE MODERN IRANIAN INSTITUTIONS AND SCHOLARS DO LITTLE TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE BETWEEN AMERICANS AND THE ULAMA. THOUSANDS OF IRANIANS HAVE STUDIED IN THE U.S. OR WESTERN EUROPE. BUT WHEN THEY RETURN TO IRAN THEIR ASPIRATIONS AND LIFE STYLE TEND TO CONFIRM THE ULAMA'S RESERVATIONS WITH REGARD TO WESTERN VALUES AND CONCEPTS. IN THEIR EAGERNESS TO ASSIMILATE A SPECIFIC DISCIPLINE OR TECHNOLOGY, CONVENTIONAL IRANIAN STUDENTS PROVIDE AMERICANS WITH LITTLE INSIGHT INTO TRADITIONAL PERSIAN THOUGHT. THEIR PREOCCUPATION WITH IMMEDIATE POLITICAL CONCERNS AND THEIR MEAGER KNOWLEDGE OF THE GREAT BODY OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT FURTHER REDUCE THEIR ABILITY TO ENTER INTO MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE WITH THOSE FEW AMERICANS PREPARED TO EXPLORE A TOTALLY FOREIGN CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.

6. THE POST THEREFORE SUGGESTS THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EXCHANGE, UNDER FULBRIGHT PROGRAM AUSPICES, WHICH WOULD BRING ONE OR TWO ADVANCED STUDENTS FROM THE FAYZIYEH SCHOOL IN QOM WHERE MANY OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS TRAINED AND TAUGHT (INCLUDING AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI) TO AN APPROPRIATE AMERICAN SCHOOL SUCH AS UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY FOR TWO YEARS. THE FIRST YEAR WOULD BE DEVOTED TO ENGLISH LANGUAGE STUDY AND EXPLORATION OF WESTERN THOUGHT. THE SECOND YEAR WOULD PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR DEEPENING DIALOGUE WITH APPROPRIATE AMERICANS AND MIGHT INCLUDE SOME FORMAL TEACHING. AT THE SAME TIME, ONE OR TWO AMERICAN GRADUATE STUDENTS OR YOUNG PROFESSORS FROM UNION THEOLOGICAL OR SOME SIMILAR INSTITUTION WOULD COME TO STUDY AND EVENTUALLY ENGAGE IN CONCERTED DIALOGUE WITH COLLEAGUES AT QOM.

7. THE POST RECOGNIZES THAT ESTABLISHING MEANINGFUL CONTACT WITH THE FAYZIYEH SCHOOL WOULD, AT BEST, REQUIRE A GREAT DEAL OF TIME, EFFORT, PATIENCE, AND TACT. THE ODDS AGAINST SUCCESS ARE GREAT. BUT THE POST HAS FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH PEOPLE WHO KNOW FAYZIYEH WELL AND MIGHT ACT AS DISCREET INTERMEDIARIES WHO COULD EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES WITHOUT IN ANY WAY ENGAGING THE MISSION. AS A FIRST STEP, THE POST THEREFORE SUGGESTS THAT, IF THE PROPOSAL APPEARS PROMISING TO THE AGENCY, THE AGENCY EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EXCHANGE WITH APPROPRIATE AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS. GRAVES

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USICA

FOR: NEA, PGM/C, PGM/P, PGM/T, ECA

E.O. 12065: N/A

SUBJ: USICA IRAN'S PROGRAM NEEDS: TURN ON THE SPIGOT

1. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE REVOLUTION, THE POST FOUND IT NECESSARY TO CURTAIL ITS STAFF AND ACTIVITIES AND THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT AGENCY PROGRAM SUPPORT SERVICES BE REDUCED OR SUSPENDED.
2. THE CLIMATE IN IRAN HAS NOW SUFFICIENTLY STABILIZED TO PERMIT RENEWED PROGRAM ACTIVITY. THE BINATIONAL CENTER IN TEHRAN, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS INITIATED A FEATURE FILM SERIES AND TWO PERSIAN PLAYS ARE CURRENTLY BOOKED IN THE IAS THEATRE. THE IAS IS ALSO EXHIBITING A PERSIAN ARTIST AND THE ART WORK OF PERSIAN CHILDREN. A PIANO CONCERT IS SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER AND SOME 3,500 STUDENTS ARE ENROLLED IN ENGLISH CLASSES. THE LIBRARY IS ATTRACTING ABOUT 150 USERS AND FIELDING 20-30 REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION A DAY. THE STUDENT COUNSELING SERVICE HAS DIFFICULTY COPING WITH DEMAND. THE BINATIONAL CENTERS IN ISPAHAN AND SHIRAZ ARE ALSO ACTIVE. THE FULBRIGHT COMMISSION IS ONCE AGAIN ORGANIZING EXCHANGES AND THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS RECENTLY COME UP WITH CANDIDATES FOR AGENCY PROGRAMS.
3. BOTH THE CLIMATE IN IRAN AND POST OBJECTIVES LIMIT SHARPLY, HOWEVER, THE KIND OF PROGRAMMING WHICH IS FEASIBLE. IRANIAN SENSITIVITIES PRECLUDE ALL BUT CLASSICAL MUSIC AND NO FILM, PLAY, OR DANCE WHICH HAS ANY OVERT SEXUAL ASPECT CAN BE USED. SIMILARLY, IRANIAN SENSITIVITIES CURRENTLY MAKE PUBLIC PROMOTION OF SOME U.S. OBJECTIVES COUNTERPRODUCTIVE (I.E., HUMAN RIGHTS, MIDDLE EAST PEACE BASED ON THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS, AMERICAN SECURITY CONCERNS). ON THE OTHER HAND, THE POST CAN MAKE EXCELLENT USE OF ANYTHING WHICH SHOWS U.S. INTEREST IN ISLAM, PERSIAN CULTURE, THE WELFARE OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN, SPIRITUAL VALUES, THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT, SELF-DETERMINATION AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF NATIONS.
4. THE POST'S KEY OBJECTIVE MUST OF NECESSITY BE TO REDUCE IRANIANS SUSPICION THAT THE U.S. IS SEEKING TO UNDERMINE THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME AND IS NOT REALLY PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH IRAN TO RESOLVE ISSUES AND PROMOTE MUTUAL INTERESTS. THE POST RECOGNIZES, OF

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COURSE, THAT THIS OBJECTIVE IS DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE AND IS THEREFORE TAKING A LONG-TERM VIEW IN PLANNING ITS COMMUNICATION PROGRAM. IRANIANS RECALL PAST U.S. POLICIES AND ACTIONS WHICH ARE NOT REASSURING TO THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME. USICA IRAN THEREFORE MUST DEVOTE RESOURCES TO ACTIVITIES WHICH MIGHT APPEAR MARGINAL IN OTHER CONTEXTS: A SERVICE ORIENTED LIBRARY WHICH FOCUSES ON IRANIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE, RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY, GENERAL REFERENCE WORKS, STUDENT COUNSELING, AND RESEARCHING REFERENCE QUESTIONS; SPEAKERS CONCERNED WITH MORAL VALUES, ISLAMIC HISTORY, PERSIAN CULTURE, AND THIRD WORLD ISSUES; FILMS AND VTR'S WHICH SHOW AMERICAN INTEREST IN MORAL VALUES, SPIRITUAL EXPERIENCE, FAMILY AND CHILDREN, PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SERVING BASIC HUMAN NEEDS; FEATURE FILMS WHICH APPEAL TO IRANS STARVED FOR ENTERTAINMENT AND INDICATE U.S. INTEREST IN HAVING FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH REVOLUTIONARY IRAN.

5. THE POST THEREFORE REQUESTS THAT AGENCY PROGRAM SUPPORT SERVICES AGAIN INCLUDE TEHRAN AS AN ADDRESSEE WHEN ANNOUNCING AVAILABLE MATERIALS AND PARTICIPANTS. THE POST RECOGNIZES THAT MUCH OF WHAT IS BEING OFFERED TO POSTS BY THE AGENCY IS INAPPROPRIATE TO IRAN AT PRESENT, BUT THE POST IS PREPARED TO COPE WITH A LARGE AMOUNT OF PAPER IN ORDER TO FASTEN ON THOSE FEW OFFERINGS WHICH ARE USEFUL IN IRAN TODAY. THE POST ALSO REQUESTS THAT PGM AND ECA ACTIVELY ENGAGE IN ACQUIRING OR DEVELOPING PROGRAM OFFERINGS WHICH MEET THE NEED OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF THIS MESSAGE.

6. THE POST REQUESTS THAT THE AGENCY SUSPEND, IN THE CASE OF USICA IRAN, RESTRICTIONS ON AGENCY PROGRAM SUPPORT SERVICES WHICH PRECLUDE ALERTING POSTS TO OFFERINGS WHICH ARE NOT CENTRAL TO THEIR PROJECT PROPOSALS BECAUSE USICA TEHRAN DOES NOT HAVE ANY PROJECT PROPOSALS ON RECORD. IF THE CLIMATE IN IRAN REMAINS REASONABLY STABLE, THE POST WILL, HOWEVER, PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE AGENCY'S NEXT PLANNING CYCLE. GRAVES
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I.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PINT, IR
SUBJECT: FRENCH MAGAZINE ON ALI SHARIATI

1. FRENCH EMBASSY CONTACT TELLS US PARIS PERIODICAL
"LES NOUVELLES LITTERAIRES" DEVOTES PRACTICALLY ITS
ENTIRE ISSUE FOR THE WEEK DECEMBER 7-14 TO IRANIAN
THINKER ALI SHARIATI (WHOSE THOUGHT IS VERY IMPORTANT
IN PRESENT SITUATION HERE). WOULD APPRECIATE PARIS AIR
POUCHING US A COPY ASAP (ATTENTION LAMBRAKIS, POLITICAL
SECTION). WILL PROVIDE FISCAL DATA IF DESIRED.

2. ASSUME DPT WILL WANT ONE OR TWO COPIES (NEA/IRN
AND INR). SULLIVAN

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DATE: 11-15-68
BY: J. J. [illegible]
TO: [illegible]
FROM: [illegible]
SUBJECT: [illegible]
RE: [illegible]

3
THE HOUSE OF SECULAR AND CLERICAL REPRESENTATIVES--THE HOUSE
OF STATE AND MATTERS OF DEBATE. SINCE THE REVOLUTION
FIGURES SUCH AS MATIN-DARTARI NAZIE, FORUMER, SANJARI,
AND RAJARGAN HIMSELF HAVE BEEN OVERSHADOWED BY KHOMEINI
AND BY HIS ALLIES WHO SHARE HIS VISION OF A THEOCRATIC
IRAN. NOT ALL OF THESE SUPPORTERS OF KHOMEINI ARE
CLERICAL; THEY INCLUDE THE "SECULAR MULLAHS" SUCH AS
KARIMIAN, YAZDI, CHAMRAN, TABATABA'I AND OTHERS. THIS
GROUP HAS DOMINATED THE GOVERNMENT, THE PRESS, THE
REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, AND THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS. IT

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GOVERNMENT AND EAST AZERBAIJAN DELEGATES TO THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS. ALTHOUGH THE AUDIENCE AND SPEAKERS HAD NO OBJECTION FOR THE OLD REGIME, THERE WERE FEELINGS OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, AND NO ANTI-AMERICAN STATEMENT.

THE SPEAKERS ELICITED THE GREATEST RESPONSE BY THEIR ATTACKS ON AHMADBAZI (CLERICAL MEDDLING). *file* THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS, AND ON ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH A THEOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP THROUGH THE VELAYAT-E-FAQH. ONE OF THE SPEAKERS FOUND THE CROWD'S PULSE WHEN HE SAID, "WE WANT THE ISLAM OF DR. STAR'ATI; WE DON'T WANT THE ISLAM OF KHOMEINI..." AND LEFT THE END EMPTY FOR THE CROWD TO FILL IN. MOQADDAM-MARAGHE'I AND ALIZADE WERE CRITICIZED FOR THE VELAYAT-E-FAQH. THE LATTER SAID, "THIS IS AN ACT OF TREASON AGAINST FUTURE GENERATIONS OF IRANIAN PEOPLE. WE HAD A REVOLUTION NOT TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR A DIFFERENT KIND OF DESPOTISM." SPRINGING IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE MEETING, MOQADDAM-MARAGHE'I SAID THAT WHEN THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP HAS NOT REALIZED THAT IT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SELL THE VELAYAT-E-FAQH TO THE IRANIAN PEOPLE IN ITS PRESENT FORM. THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS HAS DECIDED TO REOPEN DEBATE ON THIS ISSUE. I HOPE THAT SOME KIND OF IMPROVEMENT WILL BE POSSIBLE.

THE SPEAKERS, IN CRITICIZING VELAYAT-E-FAQH, HAVE FOUND SOME ALLIES AMONG CLERICS SUCH AS AYATOLLAH KHATAMI AND SHARI'AT-ADHARI WHO SHARE THE VIEW THAT SUCH AN INSTITUTION, IF NOT PROPERLY DEFINED, COULD LEAD TO A THEOCRACY. ONE OF THE MOST INTERESTING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERN THE INTENTIONS OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TO SUBJECT AN ISLAM AFFAIR KHOMEINI, INTO THE DEBATE OF IS SURVIVAL. IN THESE DEBATES, THE YOUNG KHOMEINI IS IN A POSITION WHICH HAS MUCH IN COMMON WITH THE MODERATE VIEW THAT VELAYAT-E-FAQH, AS ENDED BY THE CONSTITUTION, CONTAINS SOME DANGEROUS AMBIGUITIES. MASSY WILL DISCUSS THIS QUESTION IN MORE DETAIL IN HIS NEXT MESSAGE.

IN PART, THE OUTPOURINGS OF THE MODERATES CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO FILLUSION WITH SOME ASPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION--ESPECIALLY TENDS TOWARD AUTHORITARIAN, CLERICALISM. THE MODERATES HAVE ALSO TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S OBVIOUS MISMANAGING OF CERTAIN ISSUES TO ATTRACT ALLIES BEYOND THE USUALLY MINORITARY CONSTITUENCY OF SCOUTS & OF THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT, THE IRAN PARTY, AND THE NATIONAL FRONT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SERVICIOUS FAILURE OF A MILITARY POLICE IN AERIAL WAR BROUGHT CALLS FOR RECONCILIATION, EVEN BY FIGURES WITHIN THE REVOLUTIONARY WINGS. A COLUMNIST IN THE NORMALLY CONSERVATIVE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE IR HAS TIMES AND TIMES AGAIN SIGNIFIED OF ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY TENDS FROM THE REGION: THE IRAN PARTY LEADER, SAYING OF THE IRAN PARTY'S JOINT INVOLVEMENT IN THE STRIKE, HAS CALLED FOR AN IMMEDIATE SETTLEMENT. ONLY THE LIGHT-WEIGHT ISLAMIC PARTIES, HOWEVER, ARE ITS ORIGINAL ENEMIES. THE IRAN PARTY, HOWEVER, IS NOT THE ONLY ONE TO BE CRITICIZED. THE IRAN PARTY, HOWEVER, IS NOT THE ONLY ONE TO BE CRITICIZED. THE IRAN PARTY, HOWEVER, IS NOT THE ONLY ONE TO BE CRITICIZED.

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10. THE MODERATE GROUPS ARE ONCE AGAIN FINDING THEIR VOICE AND BEGINNING TO SPEAK OUT. IN DOING SO, THEY WILL HAVE TO OVERCOME SEVERAL MAJOR OBSTACLES:

A) THE MEDIA REMAIN FOR THE MOST PART IN THE HANDS OF THEIR OPPONENTS. KUCHUMI-YE-ISLAMI BECOMES MORE HARBID BY THE DAY, AND THE OTHER MAJOR PAPERS ARE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS. THE RADIO AND THE TELEVISION, UNDER GORBZADEH'S OPPORTUNISTIC AND UNENLIGHTENED GUIDANCE, HARPLY DEVIATES FROM ITS DAILY MENU OF PSEUDO-RELIGIOUS DRIVEL INTERSPERSED WITH PSEUDO-REVOLUTIONARY DRIVEL.

B) ALL INTELLECTUALS HAVE BEEN TAINTED BY KHOMEINI'S DENUNCIATIONS. HIS FAMOUS AUGUST DECLARATION THAT "WE DO NOT WANT INTELLECTUALS" IS STILL REMEMBERED. HIS DIATRIBES AGAINST WESTERN DECADENCE HAVE MADE ALL WESTERN MANIFESTATIONS, INCLUDING NECKTIES, SUSPECT IN HIS FOLLOWERS' EYES.

11. THESE MODERATE GROUPS STILL LEAD A PRECARIOUS EXISTENCE ON THE FRINGES OF IRANIAN POLITICAL LIFE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY ARE LEFT ALONE TO HOLD THEIR MEETINGS AND PUBLISH THEIR NEWSPAPERS BECAUSE THEY ARE CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS. HOWEVER, IN HIS MOST RECENT SPEECHES, KHOMEINI HAS TAKEN NOTE OF THEM AND HAS CRITICIZED THEM HARSHLY FOR THEIR ATTACKS ON VELAYAT-E-FAQIH AND ON THE CLERGY. IN A SPEECH TO TEHRAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS ON OCTOBER 20, KHOMEINI REFERRED DIRECTLY TO THE MPRE MEETING, SAYING, "RECENTLY, IN ONE OF THEIR MEETINGS, ONE OF THESE MISGUIDED ONES, WHO KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT ISLAM, SUGGESTED THAT THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS SHOULD BE DISSOLVED. AND THE REST CHEERED... YOU, WHO DID NOT EVEN PARTICIPATE IN THE VOTING (FOR THE COUNCIL) HAVE NO RIGHT TO SAY THIS... IT WAS THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHO GAVE YOU (OPPONENTS OF VELAYAT-E-FAQIH) THE FREEDOM TO SAY WHATEVER YOU WANT TO SAY. YOU WERE IN HIDING WHEN THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS WERE STRUGGLING AGAINST THE SHAH AND HIS FATHER. NOW YOU WANT TO DISSOLVE THE ASSEMBLY?... YOU DO NOT HAVE THE POWER TO DO SO. I WILL SLAP YOU IN THE MOUTH. STOP THIS AND JOIN THE RANKS OF ISLAM AND LET THIS COUNTRY PUT ITSELF IN ORDER."

12. KHOMEINI'S ATTACKS ON THIS GROUP ARE STILL ONLY WORDS AND ARE UNLIKELY TO TAKE THE FORM OF ALL-OUT REPRESSION INVOLVING THE CLOSING OF NEWSPAPERS, THE BANNING OF MEETINGS, AND THE ARREST OF LEADERSHIP. MANY OF THESE GROUPS AND THEIR LEADERS HAVE DISTINGUISHED RECORDS OF OPPOSITION TO THE MONARCHY--RECORDS WHICH ARE DIFFICULT TO IGNORE. HOWEVER, THE HARD-LINE CLERGY AND ITS ALLIES HAVE BEEN ISOLATING AND ATTACKING INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS FROM AMONG THE MODERATES SUCH AS NAZIH, MATIN-ASTAR, AND FORUHAR.

13. IF THE AUTHORITIES CONTINUE TO MISHANDLE SUCH MATTERS

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AS ARAB-IRANIAN RELATIONS, PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS, AND
REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE, THE MESSAGE OF THESE MODERATE
GROUPS COULD ATTRACT A WIDER FOLLOWING. ALTHOUGH THEY
ARE UNLIKELY TO OFFER A DIRECT CHALLENGE TO AYATOLLAH
CONFIDL

HIS POSITIONS ON QUESTIONS SUCH AS THOSE NOTED ABOVE.
PERHAPS THEY COULD FORCE SOME CONCESSION TO THOSE WHO
DO NOT SHARE THE IMAM'S VISION OF AN IRAN RULED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE TEACHINGS OF THAT SPECIALIZED VIEW
OF ISLAM HELD BY ONE SECTOR OF A MINORITY SECT OF THAT

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THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO PROTECT SOCIAL SECURITY,
ITS CRUDE ATTEMPTS AT CENSORSHIP, AND SCANDALS INVOLVING
THE REVOLUTIONARY COURT SYSTEM--LARGE-SCALE BRIBERY AND
THEFT INVOLVING NO LESS A FIGURE THAN FORMER THIRAN
PROSECUTOR ATAIOLLAH AGARI--COMBINED--HAS ALSO WITNESSED
THE APPEAL OF THE MODERATE PRESS. THE PAPER AZADI ON
OCTOBER 1 PRINTED A BITE-ARTICLE ON THE REVOLUTIONARY
JUSTICE SYSTEM ACCORDING TO WHICH THIEVES BY JURY,
FORMER ASSISTANT TO PROSECUTOR-GENERAL PARAVI, WHILE
HANGING PROSTITUTES AND SMALL-TIME DRUG SMUGGLERS TO THE
FIRING SQUAD. THE RECENT ATTACK ON THE JOURNALISTS BY
THE COUNCIL OF EXILES ASSISTING THE ULTRA-ESTABLISH-
MENT PAPERETTE AAT OF OCTOBER 12 TO WRITE A BITE-ARTICLE
LAST EDITORIAL ENTITLED "IT IS NOT DEFEAT NEARBY"

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HAS HARRASSED AND IGNORED ITS OPPONENTS. PAZARGAN REMAINS POWERLESS; MATIN-DAPTARI AND NAZIH ARE IN HIDING; FORNIAH IS IGNORED; AND SANJARI QUIT HIS JOB IN DISGUST AND LEFT THE COUNTRY.

4. ALTHOUGH THE POSITION OF THE MODERATE PARTIES IS STILL VERY FRAGILE, IN RECENT WEEKS THEY HAVE SHOWN SOME SIGNS OF LIFE. ALTHOUGH THEIR MOST IMPORTANT ORGANS, INCLUDING THE NEWSPAPER AYANDEHAN AND THE POPULAR HUMOR MAGAZINE AHANGAR, WERE SUPPRESSED IN AUGUST, THEY HAVE BEGUN PUBLISHING SMALL PAPERS SUCH AS SHAH-E-MOSALMAN (FROM THE MUSLIM REPUBLICAN PEOPLES PARTY); KONSEH (PUBLISHED BY ALI ASGHAR HAJ SEYED JAVADI); JEMEH-YE-AZALI FROM THE IRAN PARTY AND AZADI FROM THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT. ALTHOUGH THE CIRCULATION OF THESE PAPERS IS LIMITED AND THEY CARRY MUCH LESS INFLUENCE THAN THE THREE MAJOR DAILIES (KAYHAN, ETELAAT, AND BAMDAD) THEY DO OFFER SUBSTANTIAL AND CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON EVENTS -- A COMMENTARY OFTEN AT VARIANCE WITH THE OFFICIAL VERSION.

5. FOR THE PAST SIX WEEKS, THE MUSLIM REPUBLICAN PEOPLES PARTY (MRPP) HAS ORGANIZED FRIDAY AFTERNOON MEETINGS AT ITS TEHRAN HEADQUARTERS. ALTHOUGH THE FIRST MEETING ATTRACTED ONLY ABOUT 100 PEOPLE, EMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICER AND POLITICAL ASSISTANT ATTENDED OCTOBER 19 MEETING AND FOUND AN OVERFLOW OF OVER 1500. THE CROWD WAS LARGELY MIDDLE-CLASS AND WELL-EDUCATED. THERE WERE MANY WOMEN, SOME VEILED, A FEW CLERICS. THE SPEAKERS INCLUDED AHMAD ALIZADEH, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MRPP, AND EHSANULLAH MOGHALAN-MAFAGHE'I, LEADER OF THE MEDICAL MOVEMENT AND EAST AZERBAIJAN DELEGATE TO THE COUNCIL OF

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RELIGION.

14. IN THE LONGER TERM, IF THESE GROUPS CAN PRESERVE
SOME COHERENCE THEY MAY PRESENT AN ALTERNATIVE TO A
CLERICAL MONOPOLY OF POWER IN POST-KHOMEINI IRAN. AT
THE TIME THEIR REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS MAY BECOME
VERY IMPORTANT: BUT FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, THIS
GROUP WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE ON THE PERIPHERY OF IRANIAN
POLITICS -- ARTICULATE, INTERESTING, BUT WIELDING LITTLE
REAL POWER. LAINGEN

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